I lost the plot after Can you conceive of this? Can you take seriously the possibility that this might, actually, be true?. What followed was too lengthy, and did not seem any different from the mainstream view that all our experiences are just some computations in the brain.
An interesting observation: I can easily conceive of philosophical zombies and strong illusionism, what I have trouble conceiving is our human condition where I actually feel stuff. So what I am unable to conceive is exactly the situation I live in. I think this is true for others, too, and that’s why we call it the hard problem of consciousness; If it was conceivable, there would be no mystery.
Regarding ’no mystery, that’s exactly my experience: I am able to conceive the situation I live in, and am fine with the human condition in which I feel stuff and experience things, even though I can fundamentally be reduced to a data processing algorithm (and quite possibly could be run deterministically without ever noticing the difference.)
Once I was able to do that, the ‘hard problem’ dissolved. There’s isn’t a mystery of consciousness for me anymore; merely a mystery of “what are the details involved in constructing entities that exhibit this property”.
I lost the plot after
Can you conceive of this? Can you take seriously the possibility that this might, actually, be true?. What followed was too lengthy, and did not seem any different from the mainstream view that all our experiences are just some computations in the brain.An interesting observation: I can easily conceive of philosophical zombies and strong illusionism, what I have trouble conceiving is our human condition where I actually feel stuff. So what I am unable to conceive is exactly the situation I live in. I think this is true for others, too, and that’s why we call it the hard problem of consciousness; If it was conceivable, there would be no mystery.
Regarding ’no mystery, that’s exactly my experience: I am able to conceive the situation I live in, and am fine with the human condition in which I feel stuff and experience things, even though I can fundamentally be reduced to a data processing algorithm (and quite possibly could be run deterministically without ever noticing the difference.)
Once I was able to do that, the ‘hard problem’ dissolved. There’s isn’t a mystery of consciousness for me anymore; merely a mystery of “what are the details involved in constructing entities that exhibit this property”.