Caledonian: Let’s distinguish between the aesthetics of rationality and the pragmatics of rationality. Is my model of the world consistent, do my goals make sense—that’s pragmatics. Aesthetics is by comparison nebulous and subtle, but perhaps it encompasses both admiration for the lawlike nature of reality and self-admiration for one’s own relationship to it. :-)
It seems to me that you are taking issue with the idea that the pragmatics of rationality should be trumped by a higher cause. This essay says nothing about that. It says, first, that it’s a psychological fact that people don’t adopt rationality as a conscious value until some other, already existing value is threatened by irrationality, and second, that you won’t keep developing as a rationalist without such pressure.
As for whether reason by itself can supply supreme values, I had to ask because so many people do think you can get an ought from an is. (I still don’t know what you meant by “truth points to itself”.)
Caledonian: Let’s distinguish between the aesthetics of rationality and the pragmatics of rationality. Is my model of the world consistent, do my goals make sense—that’s pragmatics. Aesthetics is by comparison nebulous and subtle, but perhaps it encompasses both admiration for the lawlike nature of reality and self-admiration for one’s own relationship to it. :-)
It seems to me that you are taking issue with the idea that the pragmatics of rationality should be trumped by a higher cause. This essay says nothing about that. It says, first, that it’s a psychological fact that people don’t adopt rationality as a conscious value until some other, already existing value is threatened by irrationality, and second, that you won’t keep developing as a rationalist without such pressure.
As for whether reason by itself can supply supreme values, I had to ask because so many people do think you can get an ought from an is. (I still don’t know what you meant by “truth points to itself”.)