As one self-contained point (which doesn’t bear most of my intuition, isn’t strong in itself), I don’t see how finer details about the way brain actually works (e.g. roles of pleasure/desire) can be important for this question. The fact that this is apparently going to be important in the planned sequence tells me that it’ll probably go in a wrong direction. Similarly, emphasis on science, where the sheer load of empirical facts can distract from the way they should be interpreted.
Just as a preview, I don’t think the neuroscience of pleasure and desire are crucial for metaethics either, but they are useful for illustrative purposes of what possible moral reductions could mean. They can bring some clarity to our thinking about such matters. But yes, of course it matters hugely how one interprets the cognitive science relevant to metaethics.
As one self-contained point (which doesn’t bear most of my intuition, isn’t strong in itself), I don’t see how finer details about the way brain actually works (e.g. roles of pleasure/desire) can be important for this question. The fact that this is apparently going to be important in the planned sequence tells me that it’ll probably go in a wrong direction. Similarly, emphasis on science, where the sheer load of empirical facts can distract from the way they should be interpreted.
Just as a preview, I don’t think the neuroscience of pleasure and desire are crucial for metaethics either, but they are useful for illustrative purposes of what possible moral reductions could mean. They can bring some clarity to our thinking about such matters. But yes, of course it matters hugely how one interprets the cognitive science relevant to metaethics.