I would certainly prefer the outcome (1 person dies, everyone else feels really bad about it) to the outcome (2 people die, everyone else doesn’t feel bad). I think most people would in this experiment, with a small group of survivors. But there exists a number of people involved (I’ll say it’s smaller than 3^^^3) so that I would prefer outcome A to outcome B.
Therefore, considerations beside death could theoretically be significant, and utilitarianism can’t be simplified to body count.
It doesn’t seem like one event like that is significant next to entire lives unlived, though.
I would certainly prefer the outcome (1 person dies, everyone else feels really bad about it) to the outcome (2 people die, everyone else doesn’t feel bad). I think most people would in this experiment, with a small group of survivors. But there exists a number of people involved (I’ll say it’s smaller than 3^^^3) so that I would prefer outcome A to outcome B.
Therefore, considerations beside death could theoretically be significant, and utilitarianism can’t be simplified to body count.