The point is that our universe already codes some specific number of beings that are tortured, without stacking on some extra laws. That specific number would look utterly random to anyone who’s not simulating. Furthermore, the issue with informal use of complexities is… consider simple short program that iterates over every program and runs it for 3^^^^3 steps. Now, this includes stuff that you would deem to have high complexity, somewhere along the road.
The point is that our universe already codes some specific number of beings that are tortured, without stacking on some extra laws.
It doesn’t matter what our universe does. What matters is what some universe does that has a probability well over 1/3^^^^3. Stacking on extra laws can get you a universe like that, without lowering its probability that much.
I’m getting sick of informal use of complexities. Indexing 3^^^^3 beings in the universe (i mean, somehow listing their addresses) can have complexity greater than 3^^^^3 . If you don’t care for the complexity of indexing then all Kolmogorov’s complexities greater than that of a program which iterates through all programs and runs them for infinite number of steps each (ha, can do that if i choose right language), are equal. That short program produces all the universes, and all the beings, and everything.
Suppose the universe allows for hypercomputers (presumably this have a finite likelihood, and it won’t be proportional to whatever number someone puts in it later on), but it’s hard enough to do that it doesn’t happen naturally. At some point, a sapient species evolves, and a member builds hypercomputer. He simulates a universe on it, in a program called the Matrix. At some point, just for kicks, he contacts someone inside the Matrix and threatens to use his powers from outside the Matrix to kill 3^^^^3 (a number easy to make up) people if they don’t give him five dollars. If they don’t, he writes a program that can create people, and sets it to randomly create and kill 3^^^^3 of them.
Each step of this is unlikely. The unlikelihood multiplies with each successive step. At no point does it even vaguely begin to approach 1/3^^^^3.
The point is that our universe already codes some specific number of beings that are tortured, without stacking on some extra laws. That specific number would look utterly random to anyone who’s not simulating. Furthermore, the issue with informal use of complexities is… consider simple short program that iterates over every program and runs it for 3^^^^3 steps. Now, this includes stuff that you would deem to have high complexity, somewhere along the road.
It doesn’t matter what our universe does. What matters is what some universe does that has a probability well over 1/3^^^^3. Stacking on extra laws can get you a universe like that, without lowering its probability that much.
I’m getting sick of informal use of complexities. Indexing 3^^^^3 beings in the universe (i mean, somehow listing their addresses) can have complexity greater than 3^^^^3 . If you don’t care for the complexity of indexing then all Kolmogorov’s complexities greater than that of a program which iterates through all programs and runs them for infinite number of steps each (ha, can do that if i choose right language), are equal. That short program produces all the universes, and all the beings, and everything.
Suppose the universe allows for hypercomputers (presumably this have a finite likelihood, and it won’t be proportional to whatever number someone puts in it later on), but it’s hard enough to do that it doesn’t happen naturally. At some point, a sapient species evolves, and a member builds hypercomputer. He simulates a universe on it, in a program called the Matrix. At some point, just for kicks, he contacts someone inside the Matrix and threatens to use his powers from outside the Matrix to kill 3^^^^3 (a number easy to make up) people if they don’t give him five dollars. If they don’t, he writes a program that can create people, and sets it to randomly create and kill 3^^^^3 of them.
Each step of this is unlikely. The unlikelihood multiplies with each successive step. At no point does it even vaguely begin to approach 1/3^^^^3.