Assume there’s no personal CEV for certain obscurantists, then we are left with a theory that’s supposed to tells us how to make people happy—i.e. CEV—and the example of an agent who cannot be made happy through their personal CEV—i.e. an obscurantist; as the whole point of CEV is desire-satisfaction, if that fails to occur then the proposal isn’t exactly fulfilling its role. You’re correct that my musings aren’t only on CEV, as they relate to the bigger question of what is a correct desire-satisfaction theory of well-being, which in turn might require figuring out how to extrapolate utility functions.
Assume there’s no personal CEV for certain obscurantists, then we are left with a theory that’s supposed to tells us how to make people happy—i.e. CEV—and the example of an agent who cannot be made happy through their personal CEV—i.e. an obscurantist; as the whole point of CEV is desire-satisfaction, if that fails to occur then the proposal isn’t exactly fulfilling its role. You’re correct that my musings aren’t only on CEV, as they relate to the bigger question of what is a correct desire-satisfaction theory of well-being, which in turn might require figuring out how to extrapolate utility functions.