It’s nice to hear a quote from Wittgenstein. I hope we can get around to discussing the deeper meaning of this, which applies to all kinds of things… most especially, the process by which each kind of creature (bats, fish, homo sapiens, and potential embodied artifactual (n.1) minds (and also not embodied in the contemporaneously most often used sense of the term—Watson was not embodied in that sense) *constructs it’s own ontology) (or ought to, by virtuue of being embued with the right sort of architecture.)
That latter sense, and the incommensurability of competing ontologies in competing creatures (where ‘creature’ is defined defined as a hybrid, and N-tuple, of cultural legacy contructs, endemic evolutionarily bequeathed physiological sensorium, it’s individual autobiographical experience...), but not (in my view, in the theory I am developing) opaque to enlightened translatability—though the conceptual scaffolding for translaiton involves the nature of, purpose of, and boundaries, both logical and temporal of the “specious present”, the quantum zeno effect, and other considerations, so it is more suble than meets the eye)… is more of what Wittengensttein was thinking about, considering Kant’s answer to skepticism, and lots of other issues.
Your more straightforward point bears merit, however. Most of us have spend a good deal of our lives battling not issue opacity, as much as human opacity to new, expanded, revised, or unconventional ideas.
Note 1.: BY the way, I occasionally write ‘artifactual’ as opposed to ‘artificial’ because of the sense in which, as products of nature, everything we do—including building AIs—is, ipso facto, a product of nature, and hence, ‘artificial’ is an adjective we should be careful about.
It’s nice to hear a quote from Wittgenstein. I hope we can get around to discussing the deeper meaning of this, which applies to all kinds of things… most especially, the process by which each kind of creature (bats, fish, homo sapiens, and potential embodied artifactual (n.1) minds (and also not embodied in the contemporaneously most often used sense of the term—Watson was not embodied in that sense) *constructs it’s own ontology) (or ought to, by virtuue of being embued with the right sort of architecture.)
That latter sense, and the incommensurability of competing ontologies in competing creatures (where ‘creature’ is defined defined as a hybrid, and N-tuple, of cultural legacy contructs, endemic evolutionarily bequeathed physiological sensorium, it’s individual autobiographical experience...), but not (in my view, in the theory I am developing) opaque to enlightened translatability—though the conceptual scaffolding for translaiton involves the nature of, purpose of, and boundaries, both logical and temporal of the “specious present”, the quantum zeno effect, and other considerations, so it is more suble than meets the eye)… is more of what Wittengensttein was thinking about, considering Kant’s answer to skepticism, and lots of other issues.
Your more straightforward point bears merit, however. Most of us have spend a good deal of our lives battling not issue opacity, as much as human opacity to new, expanded, revised, or unconventional ideas.
Note 1.: BY the way, I occasionally write ‘artifactual’ as opposed to ‘artificial’ because of the sense in which, as products of nature, everything we do—including building AIs—is, ipso facto, a product of nature, and hence, ‘artificial’ is an adjective we should be careful about.