To reverse your last point, Sam Harris (The Moral Landscape) defends RC on the grounds that only that which is experienced can be morally significant. While agreeing, I would reply that the motivation of acts is experienced, as well as the consequences. EG: Should you vote if you live in a safe seat? You could argue that the rule “vote anyway” has beneficial consequences, but then, so does the rule “vote, except in safe seats”. RC doesn’t actually invent the rules, it only tells you how to evaluate them once invented! However, I would vote anyway because I wish to be the sort of person who does. (NB, I didn’t say “become”). That’s an example of a D-ish argument that is based on conscious experience and, it seems to me, is a valid supplement to a generally RC-based outlook.
To reverse your last point, Sam Harris (The Moral Landscape) defends RC on the grounds that only that which is experienced can be morally significant. While agreeing, I would reply that the motivation of acts is experienced, as well as the consequences. EG: Should you vote if you live in a safe seat? You could argue that the rule “vote anyway” has beneficial consequences, but then, so does the rule “vote, except in safe seats”. RC doesn’t actually invent the rules, it only tells you how to evaluate them once invented! However, I would vote anyway because I wish to be the sort of person who does. (NB, I didn’t say “become”). That’s an example of a D-ish argument that is based on conscious experience and, it seems to me, is a valid supplement to a generally RC-based outlook.