almost every proposal anyone has ever made about what a good future should maximize turns out to be a different mathematical operation performed on this one field
I think this is completely false, or at least completely false if it intends to describe conceptions of good futures in general, though maybe technically partly saved by the specific word “maximize” because maybe that word would only be used by a very specific kind of guy. E.g. I think conceptions of utopia associated with the following types of ethical views will minimally be very contrived to view in this spacetime integral way: deontology, virtue ethics, liberalism, traditionalism, preference utilitarianism[1], any kind of utilitarianism that cares about structures stretching across time (eg there being played out life narratives), views caring about the beauty of large spacetime structures, thinking of a well-lived life in terms of ongoingly chosen projects, thinking of things in terms of living a worthwhile life, thinking of human society as a being that is supposed to live a long worthwhile life, thinking of stuff in terms of good ongoing development of beings (such as humans and humanity), thinking of a good future in terms of god, any view which would be contrived to think of in terms of it seeking to create a certain kind of spacetime block, any view that rejects the claim that there should be an era of thinking about stuff followed by an era of implementing stuff (as opposed to thoughtful ethical life just continuing), etc I think a strict version of this view where you’re literally applying some sort of functional to a fun field is even false/contrived of almost all forms of welfare utilitarianism, because even those care about experiences of macroscopic beings (like, my happiness is not well-thought-of as an aggregate of happinesses of my quantum fields (or even my atoms or cells or whatever)), and usually in principle arbitrarily large ones (eg you could have a galaxy-sized happy being whose happiness is not well-thought-of as an aggregate of the happinesses of its components).
I think this is completely false, or at least completely false if it intends to describe conceptions of good futures in general, though maybe technically partly saved by the specific word “maximize” because maybe that word would only be used by a very specific kind of guy. E.g. I think conceptions of utopia associated with the following types of ethical views will minimally be very contrived to view in this spacetime integral way: deontology, virtue ethics, liberalism, traditionalism, preference utilitarianism[1], any kind of utilitarianism that cares about structures stretching across time (eg there being played out life narratives), views caring about the beauty of large spacetime structures, thinking of a well-lived life in terms of ongoingly chosen projects, thinking of things in terms of living a worthwhile life, thinking of human society as a being that is supposed to live a long worthwhile life, thinking of stuff in terms of good ongoing development of beings (such as humans and humanity), thinking of a good future in terms of god, any view which would be contrived to think of in terms of it seeking to create a certain kind of spacetime block, any view that rejects the claim that there should be an era of thinking about stuff followed by an era of implementing stuff (as opposed to thoughtful ethical life just continuing), etc
I think a strict version of this view where you’re literally applying some sort of functional to a fun field is even false/contrived of almost all forms of welfare utilitarianism, because even those care about experiences of macroscopic beings (like, my happiness is not well-thought-of as an aggregate of happinesses of my quantum fields (or even my atoms or cells or whatever)), and usually in principle arbitrarily large ones (eg you could have a galaxy-sized happy being whose happiness is not well-thought-of as an aggregate of the happinesses of its components).
at least the version that isn’t about there being many preference-seems-satisfied mental events, but about preferences actually getting satisfied