We are humans. We do not possess a utility-function. Our values and goals are not stable. We do not differentiate between means and ends, instrumental and terminal goals. Humans get bored. Humans have time preferences.
There is no crucial difference between inconsistency of goals caused by discounting versus inconsistency caused by boredom. You might enjoy collecting paperclips in 2011 and pay for a ticket to visit a paperclip conference in 2012; but then your future self in 2012 gets bored of paperclips and goes to visit Disneyland instead. That’s humane!
What would happen if humans were to discard their time preferences? We would be terrorized by our expectations, always choosing the future over the present. We would only ever pursue instrumental goals and never reach any terminal goals. We would solely care about expected utility rather than actual experience utility.
What is irrational with regard to human nature is to allow the preservation of our values to outweigh their satisfaction. We can not pick and choose our values by their weighting and at the same time retain more than a few basic goals (e.g. survival). If to be rational means to win and to win means to satisfy our values, to reach our goals, then we have to account for the fact that the preservation and satisfaction of human values are overlapping. We value how we choose and we choose what we value.
There is no crucial difference between inconsistency of goals caused by discounting versus inconsistency caused by boredom. You might enjoy collecting paperclips in 2011 and pay for a ticket to visit a paperclip conference in 2012; but then your future self in 2012 gets bored of paperclips and goes to visit Disneyland instead. That’s humane!
I disagree. In this case, I would instrumentally value collecting paperclips, perhaps because I find it fun. What has changed is how much fun I derive from paperclips, not how much I value fun. This is not a true case of preference reversal, because I have learnt new information during the time interval; if I had known that I would stop finding paperclips fun, I would not buy the ticket and I would not mind the change, as long as I could find fun in visits to Disneyland instead. This is no different from a gambler who would change his bet if he knew more about how the future would play out.
We are humans. We do not possess a utility-function. Our values and goals are not stable. We do not differentiate between means and ends, instrumental and terminal goals. Humans get bored. Humans have time preferences.
There is no crucial difference between inconsistency of goals caused by discounting versus inconsistency caused by boredom. You might enjoy collecting paperclips in 2011 and pay for a ticket to visit a paperclip conference in 2012; but then your future self in 2012 gets bored of paperclips and goes to visit Disneyland instead. That’s humane!
What would happen if humans were to discard their time preferences? We would be terrorized by our expectations, always choosing the future over the present. We would only ever pursue instrumental goals and never reach any terminal goals. We would solely care about expected utility rather than actual experience utility.
What is irrational with regard to human nature is to allow the preservation of our values to outweigh their satisfaction. We can not pick and choose our values by their weighting and at the same time retain more than a few basic goals (e.g. survival). If to be rational means to win and to win means to satisfy our values, to reach our goals, then we have to account for the fact that the preservation and satisfaction of human values are overlapping. We value how we choose and we choose what we value.
I disagree. In this case, I would instrumentally value collecting paperclips, perhaps because I find it fun. What has changed is how much fun I derive from paperclips, not how much I value fun. This is not a true case of preference reversal, because I have learnt new information during the time interval; if I had known that I would stop finding paperclips fun, I would not buy the ticket and I would not mind the change, as long as I could find fun in visits to Disneyland instead. This is no different from a gambler who would change his bet if he knew more about how the future would play out.