Suppose I build a computer where all memory contents are stored encrypted. Then any particular program module or data set is at any given time either (a) distributed across the entirety of the memory array in a way which is not any kind of spatial partition or (b) currently in cache/processor, which is sequentially occupied by all parts of the program.
This system has structure, parts, in its computation, but that structure does not correspond to any arrangement in space, and yet its substrate is an aggregation of parts in space, without requiring any quantum entanglement.
(I do not intend to assume “minds are essentially computers” in this argument; I am only attempting to disprove your claim that non-spatial parts cannot have a substrate of spatial parts.)
Mitchell_Porter’s second claim: “Therefore consciousness cannot be directly identified with any complex entity built up out of aggregation of parts in space.”
is NOT falsified by kpreid’s example.
However, kpreid has given an example of a very reasonable INDIRECT identification which Mitchell Porter’s argument would classify as “dualist”. This example illustrates that Mitchell Porter is including far more positions underneath the umbrella of “dualism” than the ordinary “substance dualism” that, for example, Decartes espoused.
Suppose I build a computer where all memory contents are stored encrypted. Then any particular program module or data set is at any given time either (a) distributed across the entirety of the memory array in a way which is not any kind of spatial partition
It is clearer to say, “where all memory addresses are encrypted”.
Suppose I build a computer where all memory contents are stored encrypted. Then any particular program module or data set is at any given time either (a) distributed across the entirety of the memory array in a way which is not any kind of spatial partition or (b) currently in cache/processor, which is sequentially occupied by all parts of the program.
This system has structure, parts, in its computation, but that structure does not correspond to any arrangement in space, and yet its substrate is an aggregation of parts in space, without requiring any quantum entanglement.
(I do not intend to assume “minds are essentially computers” in this argument; I am only attempting to disprove your claim that non-spatial parts cannot have a substrate of spatial parts.)
To expand a bit on what kpreid said:
Mitchell_Porter’s second claim: “Therefore consciousness cannot be directly identified with any complex entity built up out of aggregation of parts in space.” is NOT falsified by kpreid’s example.
However, kpreid has given an example of a very reasonable INDIRECT identification which Mitchell Porter’s argument would classify as “dualist”. This example illustrates that Mitchell Porter is including far more positions underneath the umbrella of “dualism” than the ordinary “substance dualism” that, for example, Decartes espoused.
It is clearer to say, “where all memory addresses are encrypted”.
I find your rephrasing less clear. Could you expand on the distinction you’re making?