Sorry this wasn’t clear: In the context of this post, when we endorsed “use maximality to restrict your option set, and then pick on the basis of some other criterion”, I think we were implicitly restricting to the special case where {permissible options w.r.t. the other criterion} ⊆ {permissible options w.r.t. consequentialism}. If that doesn’t hold, it’s not obvious to me what to do.
Regardless, it’s not clear to me what alternative you’d propose in this situation that’s less weird than choosing “saying ‘yeah it’s good’”. (In particular I’m not sure if you’re generally objecting to incomplete preferences per se, or to some way of choosing an option given incomplete preferences (w.r.t. consequentialism).)
In particular I’m not sure if you’re generally objecting to incomplete preferences per se, or to some way of choosing an option given incomplete preferences (w.r.t. consequentialism)
I was thinking at least a bit of both. I find the case for imprecise credences to be more compelling if they come with a decision-rule that seems reasonable to me.
Sorry this wasn’t clear: In the context of this post, when we endorsed “use maximality to restrict your option set, and then pick on the basis of some other criterion”, I think we were implicitly restricting to the special case where {permissible options w.r.t. the other criterion} ⊆ {permissible options w.r.t. consequentialism}. If that doesn’t hold, it’s not obvious to me what to do.
Regardless, it’s not clear to me what alternative you’d propose in this situation that’s less weird than choosing “saying ‘yeah it’s good’”. (In particular I’m not sure if you’re generally objecting to incomplete preferences per se, or to some way of choosing an option given incomplete preferences (w.r.t. consequentialism).)
Ah, that’s a helpful clarification.
I was thinking at least a bit of both. I find the case for imprecise credences to be more compelling if they come with a decision-rule that seems reasonable to me.