It contains a few strawmen, which then turn into non sequiturs when you say that they demonstrate that we often say irreducible things. At least that’s what I think you mean by the trivial statement “Not every set of claims is reducible to every other set of claims.”
What I’m trying to do is to make people question whether “All meaningful statements are reducible, by definition, to facts about the world”. I do this by proposing some categories which all meaningful statements are certainly NOT reducible by definition to. The argument is by analogy, sort of an outside view thing. I ask: Why stop here? Why not stop there?
“Imply” is a fact about cognitive processes, which occupy a very general space that includes all sorts of weird algorithms, even associating sounds or symbols, therefore the blanket statement “there’s no way” is false. Given that cognitive processes and words are also things, you have also claimed that you are interested in them.
My attempt was to explain the Tortoise’s position in What The Tortoise Said To Achilles. If you think I did not do so properly, I apologize. If you think that position is stupid, you’re right, if you think it’s incoherent, I’m pretty sure you’re wrong.
This second example is made of only vaguely related sentences. Did you mean “that thing, over there” to not have a definition? Would tabooing finger pointing really be so hard? Just refer to a cardinal or relative direction.
The central theme is tabooing all facts about the world. How do you define what such a fact means under such a taboo?
Reductionists are not, I hope, automatically ignorant of induction. “No cake at the center of the sun” is about something you can see, since the evidence is visible. And though seeing the sun is good evidence that the sun exists, that can never be perfect either—it’s all evidence, whether it’s the outer layer of the sun or the middle of it.
The evidence is something you can see. The thing is not. If there were a cake, the evidence would be no different. The person I am quoting would see “the sun exists” as a statement of a pattern in perceptions, “I see this-kind-of-image in this-kind-of-situation and I call this pattern ‘the sun’”.
To say that something “will” be there tomorrow refers to a prediction about the state of the world at a time-coordinate greater than the most recent one that you know of.
So it’s a prediction. What’s a prediction?
Do you see the game I’m playing here? I hope you do. It is a silly game, but it’s logically consistent, and that’s my point.
What I’m trying to do is to make people question whether “All meaningful statements are reducible, by definition, to facts about the world”. I do this by proposing some categories which all meaningful statements are certainly NOT reducible by definition to.
For starters, what do these categories you mention contain? I didn’t notice them in the Flatland section—I guess I only saw the statements, and not the argument.
Beating up lukeprog’s “is and is not” doctrine is pretty easy but not very representative, I think.
The water argument seems to be more about CEV than reductionism of ethics, and is more convincing, but I think you hit a bit of a pothole when you contrast disagreeing about definitions with “disagree[ing] about what’s important” at the end. After all, they’re disagreeing about what’s “important,” since importance is something they assign to things and not an inherent property of the things. Maybe it would help to not call it “the definition of ‘should,’” but instead call it “the titanic moral algorithm.” I can see it now:
When people disagree about morals, it’s not that they disagree about the definition of “should”—after all, that’s deprecated terminology. No, they disagree about the titanic moral algorithm.
Neither do they disagree about the definition of “the definition of should” (at least not necessarily). So just substitute the right things for the right other things and you’re fine :P
What I’m trying to do is to make people question whether “All meaningful statements are reducible, by definition, to facts about the world”. I do this by proposing some categories which all meaningful statements are certainly NOT reducible by definition to. The argument is by analogy, sort of an outside view thing. I ask: Why stop here? Why not stop there?
My attempt was to explain the Tortoise’s position in What The Tortoise Said To Achilles. If you think I did not do so properly, I apologize. If you think that position is stupid, you’re right, if you think it’s incoherent, I’m pretty sure you’re wrong.
The central theme is tabooing all facts about the world. How do you define what such a fact means under such a taboo?
The evidence is something you can see. The thing is not. If there were a cake, the evidence would be no different. The person I am quoting would see “the sun exists” as a statement of a pattern in perceptions, “I see this-kind-of-image in this-kind-of-situation and I call this pattern ‘the sun’”.
So it’s a prediction. What’s a prediction?
Do you see the game I’m playing here? I hope you do. It is a silly game, but it’s logically consistent, and that’s my point.
Hm, no, I don’t see it yet. Help me with this:
For starters, what do these categories you mention contain? I didn’t notice them in the Flatland section—I guess I only saw the statements, and not the argument.
A. Nothing
B. Definitions & Logic
C. Also observations, not unobserved or unobservable differences
D. Just the past and present, not the future
which I compare to:
E. Just the physical world, not morality
Doesn’t seem very compelling, frankly.
Oh well. What about my other arguments? Also not compelling?
Less confusing, at least :P
Beating up lukeprog’s “is and is not” doctrine is pretty easy but not very representative, I think.
The water argument seems to be more about CEV than reductionism of ethics, and is more convincing, but I think you hit a bit of a pothole when you contrast disagreeing about definitions with “disagree[ing] about what’s important” at the end. After all, they’re disagreeing about what’s “important,” since importance is something they assign to things and not an inherent property of the things. Maybe it would help to not call it “the definition of ‘should,’” but instead call it “the titanic moral algorithm.” I can see it now:
When people disagree about morals, it’s not that they disagree about the definition of “should”—after all, that’s deprecated terminology. No, they disagree about the titanic moral algorithm.
Right. But they DON’T disagree about the definition of the titanic moral agorithm. They disagree about its nature.
Neither do they disagree about the definition of “the definition of should” (at least not necessarily). So just substitute the right things for the right other things and you’re fine :P