Perhaps we can apply that here as well, and say that a substantive disagreement is one that implies a difference in what to do, in at least one possible circumstance.
It seems that “what to do” has to refer to properties of a fixed fact, so disagreement is bargaining over what actually gets determined, and so probably doesn’t even involve different anticipations.
Both your suggestions sound plausible. I’ll have to think about it more when I have time to work more on this problem, probably in the context of a planned LW post on Chalmer’s Verbal Disputes paper. Right now I have to get back to some other projects.
It seems that “what to do” has to refer to properties of a fixed fact, so disagreement is bargaining over what actually gets determined, and so probably doesn’t even involve different anticipations.
Wei Dai & Vladimir Nesov,
Both your suggestions sound plausible. I’ll have to think about it more when I have time to work more on this problem, probably in the context of a planned LW post on Chalmer’s Verbal Disputes paper. Right now I have to get back to some other projects.
Also perhaps of interest is Schroeder’s paper, A Recipe for Concept Similarity.