In those paragraphs, you add intuition as an alternative to stipulated meaning. But this is not what we are talking about, we are talking about some unknown, but normative meaning that can’t be presently stipulated, and is referred partly through intuition in a way that is more accurate than any currently available stipulation. What intuition tells is as irrelevant as what the various stipulations tell, what matters is the thing that the imperfect intuition refers. This idea doesn’t require a notion of automated stipulation (“empathic” discussion).
“some unknown, but normative meaning that can’t be presently stipulated” is what I meant by “intuitive meaning” in this case.
automated stipulation (“empathic” discussion)
I’ve never thought of ‘empathic’ discussion as ‘automated stipulation’. What do you mean by that?
Even our stipulated definitions are only promissory notes for meaning. Luckily, stipulated definitions can be quite useful for achieving our goals. Figuring out what we ‘really want’, or what we ‘rationally ought to do’ when faced with Newcomb’s problem, would also be useful. Such terms are carry even more vague promissory notes for meaning than stipulated definitions, and yet they are worth pursuing.
Treat intuition as just another stipulated definition, that happens to be expressed as a pattern of mind activity, as opposed to a sequence of words. The intuition itself doesn’t define the thing it refers to, it can be slightly wrong, or very wrong. The same goes for words. Both intuition and various words we might find are tools for referring to some abstract structure (intended meaning), that is not accurately captured by any of these tools. The purpose of intuition, and of words, is in capturing this structure accurately, accessing its properties. We can develop better understanding by inventing new words, training new intuitions, etc.
None of these tools hold a privileged position with respect to the target structure, some of them just happen to more carefully refer to it. At the beginning of any investigation, we would typically only have intuitions, which specify the problem that needs solving. They are inaccurate fuzzy lumps of confusion, too. At the same time, any early attempt at finding better tools will be unsuccessful, explicit definitions will fail to capture the intended meaning, even as intuition doesn’t capture it precisely. Attempts at guiding intuition to better precision can likewise make it a less accurate tool for accessing the original meaning. On the other hand, when the topic is well-understood, we might find an explicit definition that is much better than the original intuition. We might train new intuitions that reflect the new explicit definition, and are much better tools than the original intuition.
And as far as I can tell, you don’t agree. You express agreement too much, like your stipulated-meaning thought experiments, this is one of the problems. But I’d probably need a significantly more clear presentation of what feels wrong to make progress on our disagreement.
In those paragraphs, you add intuition as an alternative to stipulated meaning. But this is not what we are talking about, we are talking about some unknown, but normative meaning that can’t be presently stipulated, and is referred partly through intuition in a way that is more accurate than any currently available stipulation. What intuition tells is as irrelevant as what the various stipulations tell, what matters is the thing that the imperfect intuition refers. This idea doesn’t require a notion of automated stipulation (“empathic” discussion).
“some unknown, but normative meaning that can’t be presently stipulated” is what I meant by “intuitive meaning” in this case.
I’ve never thought of ‘empathic’ discussion as ‘automated stipulation’. What do you mean by that?
Even our stipulated definitions are only promissory notes for meaning. Luckily, stipulated definitions can be quite useful for achieving our goals. Figuring out what we ‘really want’, or what we ‘rationally ought to do’ when faced with Newcomb’s problem, would also be useful. Such terms are carry even more vague promissory notes for meaning than stipulated definitions, and yet they are worth pursuing.
My understanding of this topic is as follows.
Treat intuition as just another stipulated definition, that happens to be expressed as a pattern of mind activity, as opposed to a sequence of words. The intuition itself doesn’t define the thing it refers to, it can be slightly wrong, or very wrong. The same goes for words. Both intuition and various words we might find are tools for referring to some abstract structure (intended meaning), that is not accurately captured by any of these tools. The purpose of intuition, and of words, is in capturing this structure accurately, accessing its properties. We can develop better understanding by inventing new words, training new intuitions, etc.
None of these tools hold a privileged position with respect to the target structure, some of them just happen to more carefully refer to it. At the beginning of any investigation, we would typically only have intuitions, which specify the problem that needs solving. They are inaccurate fuzzy lumps of confusion, too. At the same time, any early attempt at finding better tools will be unsuccessful, explicit definitions will fail to capture the intended meaning, even as intuition doesn’t capture it precisely. Attempts at guiding intuition to better precision can likewise make it a less accurate tool for accessing the original meaning. On the other hand, when the topic is well-understood, we might find an explicit definition that is much better than the original intuition. We might train new intuitions that reflect the new explicit definition, and are much better tools than the original intuition.
As far as I can tell, I agree with all of this.
And as far as I can tell, you don’t agree. You express agreement too much, like your stipulated-meaning thought experiments, this is one of the problems. But I’d probably need a significantly more clear presentation of what feels wrong to make progress on our disagreement.
I look forward to it.
I’m not sure what you mean by “you agree too much”, though. Like I said, as far as I can tell I agree with everything in this comment of yours.