I didn’t read as carefully as I’d like, but some quick comments:
I only recently figured out there’s been persistent confusion between “original” and “intrinsic” intentionality in the literature (and in me). The former is intentionality that wasn’t brought about by some other intentionality; the latter is intentionality that does not depend on interpretation (another’s intentionality). This distinction can also apply to teleology. Helpful short paper: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3328876
It would be great to have a theory of function / telos that was ahistorical, since no one is crazy about the Swampman counterexample. But appealing to pure “structural” properties of something that ground its being supposed-to-do something (even if it fails) has turned out challenging. But maybe not impossible.
(I was going to just text you this but figured I should practice posting sometimes—catching some of your Inkhaven spirit maybe!)
I didn’t read as carefully as I’d like, but some quick comments:
I only recently figured out there’s been persistent confusion between “original” and “intrinsic” intentionality in the literature (and in me). The former is intentionality that wasn’t brought about by some other intentionality; the latter is intentionality that does not depend on interpretation (another’s intentionality). This distinction can also apply to teleology. Helpful short paper: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3328876
It would be great to have a theory of function / telos that was ahistorical, since no one is crazy about the Swampman counterexample. But appealing to pure “structural” properties of something that ground its being supposed-to-do something (even if it fails) has turned out challenging. But maybe not impossible.
(I was going to just text you this but figured I should practice posting sometimes—catching some of your Inkhaven spirit maybe!)