I disagree. So does Sidgwick, and following him, Parfit (and, I believe, Bertrand Russell). SEP (more specifically Bernard Gert) seems to think it refers to “codes of conduct”, but that still does not include compelling others to do things. Comment noting some uses of ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ in the wild.
The first definition you linked is different from the usage you provided, and the second does not claim to be about the jargon.
Morality describes the rules that govern behavior, ethics describe the principles which inform those rules, and meta-ethics describes the reason(s) why those principles and not others are the ones which inform morality.
For example, in the statement “I am the Lord Thy God; thou shalt have no other gods before Me”, the moral statement is “have no other gods”, the ethical principle behind that is “because God says so”, and the meta-ethical reason is “God is the ultimate ethical adjudicator”.
If you claim that seeking to optimize for a certain universe is what agents ‘should’ do, then you are positing a system of meta-ethics where “These acts will bring the universe closer to optimal conditions” is a justified ethics. Following that ethos, actions which result in the desired universe are what people should do and the only moral actions. In such a system there is no reason to perform an amoral action (by definition, anything that brings you closer to your desired state is moral, and anything that brings you further from your desired state is immoral; only things which you do not have a preference for are amoral).
Other systems of meta-ethics permit an individual to have a preference regarding an amoral act.
Sidgwick doesn’t define moral behavior as what an individual has the most reason to do. He does say that all agents have a reason to take a moral action, but doesn’t define moral action to mean that. He then goes on to say that what is moral
“cannot, without error, be disapproved by any other mind”
Which means that he is using a different definition of ‘rational’ in the phrase ‘rational morality’ than I am.
If you think it is immoral for Annie to eat so much salt, that is different from saying that she would be happier/healthier/closer to reaching her optimization goals/should eat less salt.
I could use your given definition to interpret what you said, and vice versa. It doesn’t matter to me what definition you use, but it is critical to me that I know what definition you use.
That’s not the philosophical jargon for ‘morality’.
I disagree. So does Sidgwick, and following him, Parfit (and, I believe, Bertrand Russell). SEP (more specifically Bernard Gert) seems to think it refers to “codes of conduct”, but that still does not include compelling others to do things. Comment noting some uses of ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ in the wild.
The first definition you linked is different from the usage you provided, and the second does not claim to be about the jargon.
Morality describes the rules that govern behavior, ethics describe the principles which inform those rules, and meta-ethics describes the reason(s) why those principles and not others are the ones which inform morality.
For example, in the statement “I am the Lord Thy God; thou shalt have no other gods before Me”, the moral statement is “have no other gods”, the ethical principle behind that is “because God says so”, and the meta-ethical reason is “God is the ultimate ethical adjudicator”.
If you claim that seeking to optimize for a certain universe is what agents ‘should’ do, then you are positing a system of meta-ethics where “These acts will bring the universe closer to optimal conditions” is a justified ethics. Following that ethos, actions which result in the desired universe are what people should do and the only moral actions. In such a system there is no reason to perform an amoral action (by definition, anything that brings you closer to your desired state is moral, and anything that brings you further from your desired state is immoral; only things which you do not have a preference for are amoral).
Other systems of meta-ethics permit an individual to have a preference regarding an amoral act.
Right, I didn’t provide a link for Sidgwick.
Sidgwick doesn’t define moral behavior as what an individual has the most reason to do. He does say that all agents have a reason to take a moral action, but doesn’t define moral action to mean that. He then goes on to say that what is moral
Which means that he is using a different definition of ‘rational’ in the phrase ‘rational morality’ than I am.
If you think it is immoral for Annie to eat so much salt, that is different from saying that she would be happier/healthier/closer to reaching her optimization goals/should eat less salt.
I don’t think this line of argument can progress further without one or both of us giving citations, and I’m not sure what good that would accomplish.
I could use your given definition to interpret what you said, and vice versa. It doesn’t matter to me what definition you use, but it is critical to me that I know what definition you use.