Although the abstract concept of a computer program (the abstractly conceived state machine which it instantiates) does not contain qualia, people often treat programs as having mind-like qualities, especially by imbuing them with semantics—the states of the program are conceived to be “about” something, just like thoughts are.
So far as I can tell, I am also in the set of programs that are treated as having mind-like qualities by imbuing them with semantics. We go to a good deal of trouble to teach people to treat themselves and others as people; this seems to be a major focus of early childhood education, language learning, and so on. “Semantics” and “aboutness” have to do with language use, after all; we learn how to make words do things.
Consciousness may not be a one-place property (“I am conscious”); it is a two-place property (“I notice that I am conscious”; “I notice that you are conscious”; “You notice that I am conscious”). After all, most of the time we are not aware of our consciousness.
So far as I can tell, I am also in the set of programs that are treated as having mind-like qualities by imbuing them with semantics. We go to a good deal of trouble to teach people to treat themselves and others as people; this seems to be a major focus of early childhood education, language learning, and so on. “Semantics” and “aboutness” have to do with language use, after all; we learn how to make words do things.
Consciousness may not be a one-place property (“I am conscious”); it is a two-place property (“I notice that I am conscious”; “I notice that you are conscious”; “You notice that I am conscious”). After all, most of the time we are not aware of our consciousness.
Consciousness is not continuous—it appears to be something we retcon after the fact.