I’ve never heard of Doug Portmore but your description of his work suggests that he is competent and may be worth reading.
I also recall Portmore used to think that some form of relativized consequentialism was likely to be the correct moral theory; I don’t know if he still thinks that.
This seems overwhelmingly likely. Especially since the alternatives that seem plausible can be conveniently represented as instances of this. This is certainly a framework in which I evaluate all proposed systems of value. When people propose things that are not relative (such crazy things as ‘total utilitarianism’) then I intuitively think of that in terms of a relative consequentialist system that happens to arbitrarily assert that certain considerations must be equal.
I’ve never heard of Doug Portmore but your description of his work suggests that he is competent and may be worth reading.
This seems overwhelmingly likely. Especially since the alternatives that seem plausible can be conveniently represented as instances of this. This is certainly a framework in which I evaluate all proposed systems of value. When people propose things that are not relative (such crazy things as ‘total utilitarianism’) then I intuitively think of that in terms of a relative consequentialist system that happens to arbitrarily assert that certain considerations must be equal.