I feel like the biggest item here is the peacekeeping mission charade.
The Russians in this video are acting like they actually believe themselves to be on a peacekeeping operation.
Though clearly implied, I want to make it explicit for emphasis: peacekeeping operations and offensive operations are maximally different. Let us put aside the question of night vision or optics, since the Ukrainians don’t have them either, and consider this problem instead: how the hell do you get your people to do what you need them to do when you won’t tell them what they need to do?
I was in the 82nd Airborne Division with the infantry for 5 years. Before we went anywhere, we got information about the kinds of things we are likely to need to do. By this I mean anywhere—it was common in Iraq or Afghanistan to move to a different location for a few days/weeks/months quite aside from the big deployment build-up. What I want to emphasize is the extremely low-tech nature of this: it was just leadership talking to us while we take a knee, so we knew what to expect and prepare for. Room clearing? Recon? Security for an election? Assaulting objectives?
For the Ukrainians this is crystal clear and universally understood: 1) Stop the Russians, wherever they are. 2) Having stopped them, throw them out.
This is so simple and so clear that it isn’t even necessary for different militia groups or military formations to talk to have an impact (though naturally, it is much more effective if they do).
The Russian soldiers rolled in actively wrong. This would have been a severe mistake even if the war was being fought with rocks and sharp sticks.
I feel like the biggest item here is the peacekeeping mission charade.
Though clearly implied, I want to make it explicit for emphasis: peacekeeping operations and offensive operations are maximally different. Let us put aside the question of night vision or optics, since the Ukrainians don’t have them either, and consider this problem instead: how the hell do you get your people to do what you need them to do when you won’t tell them what they need to do?
I was in the 82nd Airborne Division with the infantry for 5 years. Before we went anywhere, we got information about the kinds of things we are likely to need to do. By this I mean anywhere—it was common in Iraq or Afghanistan to move to a different location for a few days/weeks/months quite aside from the big deployment build-up. What I want to emphasize is the extremely low-tech nature of this: it was just leadership talking to us while we take a knee, so we knew what to expect and prepare for. Room clearing? Recon? Security for an election? Assaulting objectives?
For the Ukrainians this is crystal clear and universally understood:
1) Stop the Russians, wherever they are.
2) Having stopped them, throw them out.
This is so simple and so clear that it isn’t even necessary for different militia groups or military formations to talk to have an impact (though naturally, it is much more effective if they do).
The Russian soldiers rolled in actively wrong. This would have been a severe mistake even if the war was being fought with rocks and sharp sticks.