Fair enough. Your evidence that the Matrix Lord exists is probably laws of physics being changed in ways that appear to be the work of intelligence, and conveying information claiming to be from a Matrix Lord.
Or they could have edited your brain to think so; the point is that you are reasonably certain that the events described in the question actually happened.
How about if it’s Omega, and you’re real as far as you can tell:
Omega duplicates you. Is the copy a person? Is it you?
Omega duplicates your friend, Bob. Is the copy still Bob?
Omega simulates you. Is this sim a person? Is it you?
Omega duplicates your friend Bob. Is the copy a person? Is it Bob?
Omegacopied you, without your knowledge. You are actually in a simulation. Are you a person? Are you still “you”?
You meet a robot. As far as you can tell, it is as sentient as your friend Bob. Is the robot a person?
Omega scans your brain, simplifies it down to pure math (as complex as required to avoid changing how anything behaves) and programs this into the brain of a robot. Is this robot a person? Is it you?
Omega scans your brain. He then simulates it. Then he connects a (real) robot to the simulation. Is the result a person? Is it you?
Omega tortures you for a thousand years. Is this wrong, in your estimation?
Omega tortures your friend Bob for a thousand years. Is this wrong, in your estimation?
Omega tortures you for a thousand years, then “resets” you with nanotech to before the torture began. Is the result the same person who was tortured? Is the result the same person as before the torture?
Omega tortures you for a thousand years, then “resets” you with nanotech. Is this wrong in your estimation?
And a new one, to balance out the question that required you to be in a sim:
Omega scans you and simulates you. The simulation tells you that it’s still conscious, experiences qualia etc. and admits this seems to contradict it’s position on the ethics of simulations. Do you change your mind on anything?
Define “duplicates”, “original”, and “same” well enough to answer the Ship of Theseus problem.
Can I summarize the last question to “Omega writes a computer program which outputs ’I am conscious, experience qualia, etc. and this contradicts my position on the ethics of simulations”?
If not, what additional aspects need be included? If so, the simulation is imperfect because I do not believe that such a contradiction would be indicated.
Can I summarize the last question to “Omega writes a computer program which outputs ’I am conscious, experience qualia, etc. and this contradicts my position on the ethics of simulations”?
Well, it talks to you first. IDK what you would talk about with a perfect copy of yourself, but it says what you would expect an actual conscious copy to say (because it’s a perfect simulation.)
If so, the simulation is imperfect because I do not believe that such a contradiction would be indicated.
You don’t think finding yourself as a conscious sim would indicate sims are conscious? Because I assumed that’s what you meant by
So, I am reasonably certain that I am (part of?) a number which is being processed by an algorithm.
That breaks all of my moral values, and I have to start again from scratch.
Well, it talks to you first. IDK what you would talk about with a perfect copy of yourself, but it says what you would expect an actual conscious copy to say (because it’s a perfect simulation.)
So, it passes the Turing test, as I adjudicate it? It’s a simulation of me which sits at a computer and engages with me over the internet?
When I tell you that you are the copy of me, and prove it without significantly changing the conditions of the simulation or breaking the laws of physics, I predict that you will change your position. Promptly remove the nearest deck of cards from the pack, and throw it against the ceiling fairly hard. Only all of the black cards will land face up.
You don’t think finding yourself as a conscious sim would indicate sims are conscious?
When I recognize that numbers in general are conscious entities which experience all things simultaneously, (proof: Consider the set of all universal turing machines. Select a UTM which takes this number as input and simulates a world with some set of arbitrary conditions.) I stop caring about conscious entities and reevaluate what is and is not an agent.
Fair enough. Your evidence that the Matrix Lord exists is probably laws of physics being changed in ways that appear to be the work of intelligence, and conveying information claiming to be from a Matrix Lord.
Or they could have edited your brain to think so; the point is that you are reasonably certain that the events described in the question actually happened.
So, I am reasonably certain that I am (part of?) a number which is being processed by an algorithm.
That breaks all of my moral values, and I have to start again from scratch.
Cop-out: I decide whatever the matrix lord chooses for me to decide.
Fair enough.
How about if it’s Omega, and you’re real as far as you can tell:
And a new one, to balance out the question that required you to be in a sim:
Omega scans you and simulates you. The simulation tells you that it’s still conscious, experiences qualia etc. and admits this seems to contradict it’s position on the ethics of simulations. Do you change your mind on anything?
Define “duplicates”, “original”, and “same” well enough to answer the Ship of Theseus problem.
Can I summarize the last question to “Omega writes a computer program which outputs ’I am conscious, experience qualia, etc. and this contradicts my position on the ethics of simulations”?
If not, what additional aspects need be included? If so, the simulation is imperfect because I do not believe that such a contradiction would be indicated.
Well, it talks to you first. IDK what you would talk about with a perfect copy of yourself, but it says what you would expect an actual conscious copy to say (because it’s a perfect simulation.)
You don’t think finding yourself as a conscious sim would indicate sims are conscious? Because I assumed that’s what you meant by
So, it passes the Turing test, as I adjudicate it? It’s a simulation of me which sits at a computer and engages with me over the internet?
When I tell you that you are the copy of me, and prove it without significantly changing the conditions of the simulation or breaking the laws of physics, I predict that you will change your position. Promptly remove the nearest deck of cards from the pack, and throw it against the ceiling fairly hard. Only all of the black cards will land face up.
When I recognize that numbers in general are conscious entities which experience all things simultaneously, (proof: Consider the set of all universal turing machines. Select a UTM which takes this number as input and simulates a world with some set of arbitrary conditions.) I stop caring about conscious entities and reevaluate what is and is not an agent.