Events have probabilities. Theories don’t. Given some theory of meteorology, you can predict the probability it will snow in Feb. But you can’t say the probability that that theory of meteorology is true.
Did you read the context? Someone asked the Popperian view on giving a probability of future weather. So I answered that. What exactly do you think the context is?
The scientific method as a special case of Bayes theorem and whether the not directly experimental aspects can be mapped on some part of Bayesian reasoning. Now that you pointed it out I can see that you were only referring to the narrow sub-point in the great-gandparent and not the wider context, but it looked to me like you were also arguing that since theories don’t have (frequentlialist) probabilities Popperian reasoning about them couldn’t map to probabilistically framed Bayesian reasoning. Looking at the votes it seems I wasn’t alone in that (mis-)reading.
Events have probabilities. Theories don’t. Given some theory of meteorology, you can predict the probability it will snow in Feb. But you can’t say the probability that that theory of meteorology is true.
That’s true for frequentialist probabilities, but irrelevant in this context.
Did you read the context? Someone asked the Popperian view on giving a probability of future weather. So I answered that. What exactly do you think the context is?
The scientific method as a special case of Bayes theorem and whether the not directly experimental aspects can be mapped on some part of Bayesian reasoning. Now that you pointed it out I can see that you were only referring to the narrow sub-point in the great-gandparent and not the wider context, but it looked to me like you were also arguing that since theories don’t have (frequentlialist) probabilities Popperian reasoning about them couldn’t map to probabilistically framed Bayesian reasoning. Looking at the votes it seems I wasn’t alone in that (mis-)reading.