Expert opinions are not fungible. If an expert shows me something like: “based on extensive testing using accepted, peer reviewed, and replicated scientific methodology we have ruled out alternatives to so that X is generally accepted in the field.” I may be pretty happy to a-priori defer to X being true. However, if an expert just tells me “most people in the field are of the opinion X” I might be very slightly more inclined to think “X” but I am not going to defer to it as true.
“I am an expert, I think X” is not a valid basis for an expert opinion. In a legal setting, to consider an expert opinion courts rely on the Daubert standard, which, in simple terms, requires the opinion to be derived from a validated/accepted scientific methodology. An expert just going “I think X” is not an expert opinion the courts are going to accept. An expert saying “having performed some accepted scientific analysis and following such procedures I have reached X conclusion” is more likely to be accepted as an expert opinion (of course, there can be a lot of complexities in how they are actually judged by courts).
Bailey: You cannot rationally weigh your inside view more than the views of others, or disagree much with expert consensus, or whoever is considered epistemically in charge around here, unless you can cite specific information you have that they don’t have access to. If you do, you are making a claim of high status, and that they are relatively stupid.
I would defend a modified version of this Bailey: if your views contract ‘expert consensus’ (that is, ‘an evidence-based derived through through rigorous scientific debate and peer review’) it is generally more likely that you are mistaken then that the expert consensus is wrong. You should first consider that the consensus may have reasons and explanations you are unaware of or that you made an error somewhere, you should rule those out and be able to point to specific demonstrably reasons to reject to the expert consensus before placing much credence in them.
Epistemic peer means that, if you both have access to the same information, and they have not yet explained to you their reasoning, you should not presume one of you is better at this than the other, so you should probably take the two unadjusted opinions and split the difference.
This is a very strange understanding of “defer”, are you sure it was Yud meant by “defer”? I would read “defer” as meaning “I would default to assuming they are right.” I would argue that this is the wrong approach.
You should not (imo) assume someone is right just because they are an expert. You should judge someone’s opinion based on their reasons for believing it. IF you don’t have information about those reasons, then you should place only little weight on their beliefs no matter whether you think they are your epistemic peer. That isn’t to say you even need a full analysis of their reasoning, but you need to at least know something about it to place much weight ton their view.
This is exactly the attitude Eliezer is describing:
You would have to confirm with the OP, but I think you are misrepresenting his statement. It certainly does not seem to be a steelman of the implicit case. The implicit case they seem to making is “Eliezer Yudkowsky appears to believe himself to be superior and dismisses the arguments of others without reasons.” TO which it seems Eliezer Yudkowsky responded along the lines of (paraphrasing) “I did give evidence and reasons, I just didn’t mention giving evidence in that particular lesswrong post due to lesswrongese/context/rhetorical effect, it was Leopold who was focused on arguing over status, not me.”
To close, here is a quick list of the top 10 reasons to decide to disagree with an expert or general consensus, either locally or globally, including a market price, or with others who might otherwise be presumed to know better.
I am just going to through these.
The Baily you gave allows for disagreeing if “you can cite specific information you have that they don’t have access to,” but requires you to evidence it. I think that covers this case, just requires you show your information, which seems fair enough.
I don’t think “I devoted more attention” is a valid grounds for thinking you are more/less right. The amount of attention devoted seems largely irrelevant, imo. I care about the validity of the reasoning and the strength of the evidence supporting that reasoning, not the amount of attention making the argument. Many of the smartest people in the world devoted their entire lives to thinking about arguments for their idea of the divine, but I don’t think that makes their ideas any more (or less!) valid.
I would say this is largely identical to 1, assuming the reasons are information. If you can cite a specific error they make or fact their arguments don’t account for, I think you should have to show it. And first I would suggest looking into if this is something that experts actually have discussed, it quite likely is.
If there reasoning is bad, I would say it is on you to confirm and show where it goes wrong and exactly how.
Same as 3 and 4.
I don’t think this is a good reason. In so far as it is true, you should be able to show them wrong (see 3), it is not something you should assume.
This is why what I call “consensus” would not be “a lot of smart people say so” as I described. “Consensus” in academia is/aught to be derived from the weight of the evidence in peer review, not the number of people saying they believe the thing.
This seems interchangeable with 6, in so far as it is true, it’s truth is only relevant if you can actually show their reasoning to be wrong or to not explain something that hasn’t been considered.
Having an unexplained feeling you are being lied to is not, imo, a very good reason to dismiss someone’s opinions. If you can demonstrate a reason to believe that they are being disingenuous then do that. Otherwise, this isn’t a good reason and arguments should have to be contended with.
I think my idea of expertise and consensus covers this. You should differ to expertise/consensus based on rigor, methodology, evidence etc, not personal perceptions of status.
I think the fundamental ideas behind Daubert in legal settings and the idea of “scientific consensus” in academic literature are fairly decent standards. Potholer54 had a great discussion of scientific consensus.
Expert opinions are not fungible. If an expert shows me something like: “based on extensive testing using accepted, peer reviewed, and replicated scientific methodology we have ruled out alternatives to so that X is generally accepted in the field.” I may be pretty happy to a-priori defer to X being true. However, if an expert just tells me “most people in the field are of the opinion X” I might be very slightly more inclined to think “X” but I am not going to defer to it as true.
“I am an expert, I think X” is not a valid basis for an expert opinion. In a legal setting, to consider an expert opinion courts rely on the Daubert standard, which, in simple terms, requires the opinion to be derived from a validated/accepted scientific methodology. An expert just going “I think X” is not an expert opinion the courts are going to accept. An expert saying “having performed some accepted scientific analysis and following such procedures I have reached X conclusion” is more likely to be accepted as an expert opinion (of course, there can be a lot of complexities in how they are actually judged by courts).
I would defend a modified version of this Bailey: if your views contract ‘expert consensus’ (that is, ‘an evidence-based derived through through rigorous scientific debate and peer review’) it is generally more likely that you are mistaken then that the expert consensus is wrong. You should first consider that the consensus may have reasons and explanations you are unaware of or that you made an error somewhere, you should rule those out and be able to point to specific demonstrably reasons to reject to the expert consensus before placing much credence in them.
This is a very strange understanding of “defer”, are you sure it was Yud meant by “defer”? I would read “defer” as meaning “I would default to assuming they are right.” I would argue that this is the wrong approach.
You should not (imo) assume someone is right just because they are an expert. You should judge someone’s opinion based on their reasons for believing it. IF you don’t have information about those reasons, then you should place only little weight on their beliefs no matter whether you think they are your epistemic peer. That isn’t to say you even need a full analysis of their reasoning, but you need to at least know something about it to place much weight ton their view.
You would have to confirm with the OP, but I think you are misrepresenting his statement. It certainly does not seem to be a steelman of the implicit case. The implicit case they seem to making is “Eliezer Yudkowsky appears to believe himself to be superior and dismisses the arguments of others without reasons.” TO which it seems Eliezer Yudkowsky responded along the lines of (paraphrasing) “I did give evidence and reasons, I just didn’t mention giving evidence in that particular lesswrong post due to lesswrongese/context/rhetorical effect, it was Leopold who was focused on arguing over status, not me.”
I am just going to through these.
The Baily you gave allows for disagreeing if “you can cite specific information you have that they don’t have access to,” but requires you to evidence it. I think that covers this case, just requires you show your information, which seems fair enough.
I don’t think “I devoted more attention” is a valid grounds for thinking you are more/less right. The amount of attention devoted seems largely irrelevant, imo. I care about the validity of the reasoning and the strength of the evidence supporting that reasoning, not the amount of attention making the argument. Many of the smartest people in the world devoted their entire lives to thinking about arguments for their idea of the divine, but I don’t think that makes their ideas any more (or less!) valid.
I would say this is largely identical to 1, assuming the reasons are information. If you can cite a specific error they make or fact their arguments don’t account for, I think you should have to show it. And first I would suggest looking into if this is something that experts actually have discussed, it quite likely is.
If there reasoning is bad, I would say it is on you to confirm and show where it goes wrong and exactly how.
Same as 3 and 4.
I don’t think this is a good reason. In so far as it is true, you should be able to show them wrong (see 3), it is not something you should assume.
This is why what I call “consensus” would not be “a lot of smart people say so” as I described. “Consensus” in academia is/aught to be derived from the weight of the evidence in peer review, not the number of people saying they believe the thing.
This seems interchangeable with 6, in so far as it is true, it’s truth is only relevant if you can actually show their reasoning to be wrong or to not explain something that hasn’t been considered.
Having an unexplained feeling you are being lied to is not, imo, a very good reason to dismiss someone’s opinions. If you can demonstrate a reason to believe that they are being disingenuous then do that. Otherwise, this isn’t a good reason and arguments should have to be contended with.
I think my idea of expertise and consensus covers this. You should differ to expertise/consensus based on rigor, methodology, evidence etc, not personal perceptions of status.