I think there’s a significant difference in having a reputation for lying, and a reputation for truth but Not Technically a Lie. The difference is, it is meaningless to converse with a person with a reputation for lying on a subject they are likely to lie about. One can however converse with someone with a reputation for NTL, because you know they will answer truthfully—but you have to avoid filling in vagueness like you would for an honest person. If need be, you can choose an exact wording and ask them to repeat it. Note: my presumption is that you cannot earn a reputation for Not Technically Lying if you are willing to blatantly lie when you can’t NTL.
Another difference is that part of the responsibility for the untruth belongs to the person filling in the details that make the Not Technically a Lie become false. You may think otherwise, but let me ask you this: how much effort are you willing to go through to make sure that nobody misinterprets anything you say in a way that would be false? At some point you will decide that the majority or entirety of the fault for a false interpretation belongs to the listener. Then it all comes down to intent, which will make the consequentialists among us rather nervous.
At some point you will decide that the majority or entirety of the fault for a false interpretation belongs to the listener. Then it all comes down to intent, which will make the consequentialists among us rather nervous.
If Sam expresses themselves in such a way that the most likely interpretation of their expression is A, in a situation where Sam knows that NOT A, Sam is doing something which is expected to result in their audience believing a falsehood. Presumably that’s what a consequentialist cares about. No nervousness required, and intent is relevant only insofar as it influences actual behavior.
Whether we call what Sam is doing a “lie” or not, and whether we decide Sam is a bad person or not, is an entirely different question.
I agree with you about the differential reliability of an outright liar and a NTL-er, though.
I think there’s a significant difference in having a reputation for lying, and a reputation for truth but Not Technically a Lie. The difference is, it is meaningless to converse with a person with a reputation for lying on a subject they are likely to lie about. One can however converse with someone with a reputation for NTL, because you know they will answer truthfully—but you have to avoid filling in vagueness like you would for an honest person. If need be, you can choose an exact wording and ask them to repeat it. Note: my presumption is that you cannot earn a reputation for Not Technically Lying if you are willing to blatantly lie when you can’t NTL.
Another difference is that part of the responsibility for the untruth belongs to the person filling in the details that make the Not Technically a Lie become false. You may think otherwise, but let me ask you this: how much effort are you willing to go through to make sure that nobody misinterprets anything you say in a way that would be false? At some point you will decide that the majority or entirety of the fault for a false interpretation belongs to the listener. Then it all comes down to intent, which will make the consequentialists among us rather nervous.
If Sam expresses themselves in such a way that the most likely interpretation of their expression is A, in a situation where Sam knows that NOT A, Sam is doing something which is expected to result in their audience believing a falsehood. Presumably that’s what a consequentialist cares about. No nervousness required, and intent is relevant only insofar as it influences actual behavior.
Whether we call what Sam is doing a “lie” or not, and whether we decide Sam is a bad person or not, is an entirely different question.
I agree with you about the differential reliability of an outright liar and a NTL-er, though.