I’m not sure I can talk about this effectively in the differential progress framework. My argument is that if we expect to die to slop, we should push against slop. In particular, if we expect to die to slop-at-big-labs, we should push against slop-at-big-labs. This seems to suggest a high degree of information-sharing about anti-slop tech.
Anti-slop tech is almost surely also going to push capabilities in general. If we currently think slop is a big source of risk, it seems worth it.
Put more simply: if someone is already building superintelligence & definitely going to beat you & your allies to it, then (under some semi-plausible additional assumptions) you want to share whatever safety tech you have with them, disregarding differential-progress heuristics.
Again, I’m not certain of this model. It is a costly move in the sense of having a negative impact on some possible worlds where death by slop isn’t what actually happens.
I’m not sure I can talk about this effectively in the differential progress framework. My argument is that if we expect to die to slop, we should push against slop. In particular, if we expect to die to slop-at-big-labs, we should push against slop-at-big-labs. This seems to suggest a high degree of information-sharing about anti-slop tech.
Anti-slop tech is almost surely also going to push capabilities in general. If we currently think slop is a big source of risk, it seems worth it.
Put more simply: if someone is already building superintelligence & definitely going to beat you & your allies to it, then (under some semi-plausible additional assumptions) you want to share whatever safety tech you have with them, disregarding differential-progress heuristics.
Again, I’m not certain of this model. It is a costly move in the sense of having a negative impact on some possible worlds where death by slop isn’t what actually happens.