Neuroscience can match off known neural activity to known sensations on aposteriori evidence, but it cannot provide a principled and predictive explanation of why a particular neural event should feel a particular way.
How we verbally categorise phenomenal feels is also not the hard problem.
The ego is also not the hard problem. You might want to say that egos don’t exist, but it seems to us thatvwe have them, or we feel we have them. That is a dissolution of the ego, not of qualia.
Neuroscience can match off known neural activity to known sensations on aposteriori evidence, but it cannot provide a principled and predictive explanation of why a particular neural event should feel a particular way.
How we verbally categorise phenomenal feels is also not the hard problem.
The ego is also not the hard problem. You might want to say that egos don’t exist, but it seems to us thatvwe have them, or we feel we have them. That is a dissolution of the ego, not of qualia.