Do you not agree that any explanation that is sufficient to explain why we talk about consciousness necessarily entails an explanation of consciousness itself?
Sort of—only on the rather trivial grounds that if talk of conscious experience is caused by conscious experience, then an explanation of the talk must explain how it is caused by conscious experience, and for the explanation to go beyond the assertion that it is so caused, it must contain some sort of explanation of consciousness.
But Graziano’s explanation is not of this nature. He explains talk of conscious experience by the existence of models within the brain. One cannot argue that because this is an explanation of the talk, it must be an explanation of consciousness; it may just be a wrong explanation of the talk.
Sort of—only on the rather trivial grounds that if talk of conscious experience is caused by conscious experience, then an explanation of the talk must explain how it is caused by conscious experience, and for the explanation to go beyond the assertion that it is so caused, it must contain some sort of explanation of consciousness.
But Graziano’s explanation is not of this nature. He explains talk of conscious experience by the existence of models within the brain. One cannot argue that because this is an explanation of the talk, it must be an explanation of consciousness; it may just be a wrong explanation of the talk.
Fair enough.