I wouldn’t say I have much more detail (interested if other authors or readers have)!
But a central theory example I’d point to would be Myerson-Satterthwaite, which from your comment sounds like one (or similar to some) already on your radar.
Similarly, my go-to types of ‘solution’ to this include reputation and generally iteration and larger contexts (without having a theorem to cite). I also point to getting more parties and more bargaining ‘dimensions’ on the table (again without having a theorem to cite).
Some have claimed it’s not too big a deal in practice (i.e. efficiency losses or required subsidies are low).
Do you have go-to materials or sources for this area?
it’s not too big a deal in practice (i.e. efficiency losses or required subsidies are low).
I skimmed this paper (and chatted to an AI about it but I don’t have much confidence in its understanding). Unfortunately it doesn’t look obviously relevant since it assumes a small number of discrete possible valuations for each side, but the real world bargaining looks more like the continuous case, since each side can have many possible subjective valuations for some opportunity.
I wouldn’t say I have much more detail (interested if other authors or readers have)!
But a central theory example I’d point to would be Myerson-Satterthwaite, which from your comment sounds like one (or similar to some) already on your radar.
Similarly, my go-to types of ‘solution’ to this include reputation and generally iteration and larger contexts (without having a theorem to cite). I also point to getting more parties and more bargaining ‘dimensions’ on the table (again without having a theorem to cite).
Some have claimed it’s not too big a deal in practice (i.e. efficiency losses or required subsidies are low).
Do you have go-to materials or sources for this area?
No, I haven’t been following this field, and the above is about the limit of my knowledge.
I skimmed this paper (and chatted to an AI about it but I don’t have much confidence in its understanding). Unfortunately it doesn’t look obviously relevant since it assumes a small number of discrete possible valuations for each side, but the real world bargaining looks more like the continuous case, since each side can have many possible subjective valuations for some opportunity.