I’m not sure whether we’ll be able to get something to work here. But one thought is that it’s actually very easy to violate the conditions of the theorems (I say, without being super up to speed on the literature): they assume rational play from the parties.
In practice all players are boundedly rational. Maybe this gives you room to get something going: if optimal play is very sensitive to the setup in a way that the players can’t really calculate, bounded rationality could push them to act in ways that are less exploitative.
I’m not sure whether we’ll be able to get something to work here. But one thought is that it’s actually very easy to violate the conditions of the theorems (I say, without being super up to speed on the literature): they assume rational play from the parties.
In practice all players are boundedly rational. Maybe this gives you room to get something going: if optimal play is very sensitive to the setup in a way that the players can’t really calculate, bounded rationality could push them to act in ways that are less exploitative.
But maybe this will turn out not to work.