Hume defends two separate theses, inductive fallibilism and inductive skepticism, at different points in his work. Inductive fallibilism, that inductive arguments are inherently fallible, is widely accepted in philosophy. Inductive skepticism, that induction can never be justified, is not. Inductive probabilism, that induction gives us probabilities, is a position that accepts inductive fallibilism. David Stove’s Scientific Irrationalism gives a good account of why inductive fallibilism succeeds where inductive skepticism fails. He also hammers on the important point that the problem of induction is a logical thesis and not a historical thesis; it’s a problem of justifying induction and not a description of induction. Induction is still possible even if you can’t justify it. The problem of induction is also only a problem if you accept Hume’s premises (big-E Empiricism) and, obviously, the methodology of philosophy to begin with.
Hume defends two separate theses, inductive fallibilism and inductive skepticism, at different points in his work. Inductive fallibilism, that inductive arguments are inherently fallible, is widely accepted in philosophy. Inductive skepticism, that induction can never be justified, is not. Inductive probabilism, that induction gives us probabilities, is a position that accepts inductive fallibilism. David Stove’s Scientific Irrationalism gives a good account of why inductive fallibilism succeeds where inductive skepticism fails. He also hammers on the important point that the problem of induction is a logical thesis and not a historical thesis; it’s a problem of justifying induction and not a description of induction. Induction is still possible even if you can’t justify it. The problem of induction is also only a problem if you accept Hume’s premises (big-E Empiricism) and, obviously, the methodology of philosophy to begin with.