I understand the ‘compatibilist’ view on free will to be something like this: determinism is true, but we still run some algorithm which deterministically picks between options, so the algorithm that we are is still ‘making a choice’, which I choose to conceptualize as “free will and determinism are compatible”
I would rather conceptualize it as acting according to my value system without excessive external coercion. But I would also say that I agree with all four claims that you made there, namely:
Determinism is true
We run some algorithm which deterministically picks between options
We are making a choice
Free will and determinism are compatible
Anti-realists about free will” and I have no actual disagreement about the underlying reality of determinism being true and us being predictable.
Yeah, I would agree that we are predictable in principle.
If so, is your view on qualia similar, in that you’ve mostly re-conceptualized it instead of having “noticed a metaphysically fundamental thing”?
I used to think that qualia was a reducible and non-fundamental phenomenon, whereas now I think it is an irreducible and fundamental phenomenon. So I did “notice a metaphysically fundamental thing”.
I used to think that qualia was a reducible and non-fundamental phenomenon, whereas now I think it is an irreducible and fundamental phenomenon. So I did “notice a metaphysically fundamental thing”.
Okay, interesting.
If you want to give further confirmation, I’d ask “what is qualia, in your ontology”, and “what does it mean for something to be irreducible or metaphysically fundamental?”.
Also, another thing I’m interested in is how someone could have helped past you (and camp #1 people generally) understand what camp #2 even means. There may be a formal-alignment failure mode not noticeable to people in camp #1 where a purely mathematical[1] prior does not contain any hypothesis corresponding to reality, analogous to if you used a prior only containing hypotheses capable of being expressed in some restricted formal system while receiving input generated by a mathematical world only expressible in some less restricted formal system.
It sounds to me like you previously experienced qualia, but explained it away as “reducible”—but even if it could be reduced/decomposed (which maybe it can be), it would still be ‘something which is metaphysically fundamental and not-pure-math’, right? (I’m guessing past you would have… disagreed, or maybe have not thought about it in this way, kind of like hypothesis (A)). If that was the crux, how could it have been pointed out to you at the time?
It the direct phenomenal experience of stuff like pain, pleasure, colors, etc.
what does it mean for something to be irreducible or metaphysically fundamental
Something is irreducible in a sense that it can’t be reduced to interactions between atoms. It can’t also be completely completely described from a 3rd person perspective (the perspective from which science usually operates).
Also, another thing I’m interested in is how someone could have helped past you (and camp #1 people generally) understand what camp #2 even means. There may be a formal-alignment failure mode not noticeable to people in camp #1 where a purely mathematical (it may help to read that as ‘3rd-person’)
I don’t remember the exact specifics, but I came across Mary’s Room thought experience (perhaps through this video). When presented in that way and when directly asked “does she learn anything new?” my surprising (to myself at the time) answer was an emphatic “yes”.
I would rather conceptualize it as acting according to my value system without excessive external coercion. But I would also say that I agree with all four claims that you made there, namely:
Determinism is true
We run some algorithm which deterministically picks between options
We are making a choice
Free will and determinism are compatible
Yeah, I would agree that we are predictable in principle.
I used to think that qualia was a reducible and non-fundamental phenomenon, whereas now I think it is an irreducible and fundamental phenomenon. So I did “notice a metaphysically fundamental thing”.
Okay, interesting.
If you want to give further confirmation, I’d ask “what is qualia, in your ontology”, and “what does it mean for something to be irreducible or metaphysically fundamental?”.
Also, another thing I’m interested in is how someone could have helped past you (and camp #1 people generally) understand what camp #2 even means. There may be a formal-alignment failure mode not noticeable to people in camp #1 where a purely mathematical[1] prior does not contain any hypothesis corresponding to reality, analogous to if you used a prior only containing hypotheses capable of being expressed in some restricted formal system while receiving input generated by a mathematical world only expressible in some less restricted formal system.
It sounds to me like you previously experienced qualia, but explained it away as “reducible”—but even if it could be reduced/decomposed (which maybe it can be), it would still be ‘something which is metaphysically fundamental and not-pure-math’, right? (I’m guessing past you would have… disagreed, or maybe have not thought about it in this way, kind of like hypothesis (A)). If that was the crux, how could it have been pointed out to you at the time?
(per your next comment, it may help to read this word as ‘3rd-person’)
It the direct phenomenal experience of stuff like pain, pleasure, colors, etc.
Something is irreducible in a sense that it can’t be reduced to interactions between atoms. It can’t also be completely completely described from a 3rd person perspective (the perspective from which science usually operates).
Thanks! (I added a bunch of text to my comment while you were writing, also.)
I will try reply to your edit:
I don’t remember the exact specifics, but I came across Mary’s Room thought experience (perhaps through this video). When presented in that way and when directly asked “does she learn anything new?” my surprising (to myself at the time) answer was an emphatic “yes”.