I suggest a simple explanation: some of us have qualia and some of us don’t.
Well that’s an alarming hypothesis.
I’ve seen expressed (and held the view personally) that a world devoid of qualia is an example of a world devoid of value, in the consequentialist sense. …but at least in my case, my view was somewhat grounded in the idea that all people are morally significant combined with the implicit assumption that the overwhelming majority of adults experience qualia, so updating to a higher probability of “a significant fraction of people alive today do not experience anything like qualia” ought to also come with an update away from “non-qualia-experiencing agents lack moral value”.
I worry that some people may hold my prior view uncritically, and see an admission of not experiencing qualia as a moral license to disregard the person’s well-being. See various historical takes about “X minority doesn’t have souls” and the resultant treatment.
Well, I can experience happiness and sadness, and all the usual other emotions, so I just always assumed that was enough to make me a morally significant entity.
Well that’s an alarming hypothesis.
I’ve seen expressed (and held the view personally) that a world devoid of qualia is an example of a world devoid of value, in the consequentialist sense. …but at least in my case, my view was somewhat grounded in the idea that all people are morally significant combined with the implicit assumption that the overwhelming majority of adults experience qualia, so updating to a higher probability of “a significant fraction of people alive today do not experience anything like qualia” ought to also come with an update away from “non-qualia-experiencing agents lack moral value”.
I worry that some people may hold my prior view uncritically, and see an admission of not experiencing qualia as a moral license to disregard the person’s well-being. See various historical takes about “X minority doesn’t have souls” and the resultant treatment.
Well, I can experience happiness and sadness, and all the usual other emotions, so I just always assumed that was enough to make me a morally significant entity.