I think that if one has moral uncertainty and a moral anti-realist position, one is also deeply confused.
Why? There isn’t anything incoherent about assigning a non-zero or non-one probability to a proposition F that states that a sentence G is or is not propositional.
I suppose we should divide moral uncertainty into two categories: a) Non-certainty about whether there’s some (positive, negative or zero) “real moral value” attached to a given action X. b) Given that such a value exists, non-certainty about its value.
So far I considered moral uncertainty to just mean (b), but it can ofcourse mean (a) as well, you’re correct about that.
Why? There isn’t anything incoherent about assigning a non-zero or non-one probability to a proposition F that states that a sentence G is or is not propositional.
I suppose we should divide moral uncertainty into two categories:
a) Non-certainty about whether there’s some (positive, negative or zero) “real moral value” attached to a given action X.
b) Given that such a value exists, non-certainty about its value.
So far I considered moral uncertainty to just mean (b), but it can ofcourse mean (a) as well, you’re correct about that.