Your criticism of the philosophy/philosophers is misguided on a number of accounts.
1. You’re basing those criticisms on the presentation in a video designed to present philosophy to the masses. That’s like reading some phys.org arg article claiming that electrons can be in two locations at once and using that to critisize the theory of Quantum Mechanics.
2. The problem philosophers are interested in addressing may not be the one you are thinking of. Philosophers would never suggest that the assumption of logical omniscience prevents one from using Bayesianism as a practical guide towards reasoning or that it’s not often a good idealization to treat degrees of belief as probabilities. However, I believe the question that this discussion is in relation to is in giving a theory that explains the fundamental nature of probability claims and here the fact that we really aren’t logically omniscient prevents us from identifying probabilities with something like rational degrees of belief (though that proposal has other problems too).
3. It’s not like philosophers haven’t put in plenty of effort looking for probability like systems that don’t presume logical omniscience. They have developed any number of them but none seem particularly useful and I’m not convinced that the paper you link about this will be much different (not that they are wrong just not that useful).
I don’t want to base my argument on that video. It’s based on the intuitions for philosophy I developed doing my BA in it at Oxford. I expect to be able to find better examples, but don’t have the energy to do that now. This should be read more as “I’m pointing at something that others who have done philosophy might also have experienced”, rather than “I’m giving a rigorous defense of the claim that even people outside philosophy might appreciate”.
Your criticism of the philosophy/philosophers is misguided on a number of accounts.
1. You’re basing those criticisms on the presentation in a video designed to present philosophy to the masses. That’s like reading some phys.org arg article claiming that electrons can be in two locations at once and using that to critisize the theory of Quantum Mechanics.
2. The problem philosophers are interested in addressing may not be the one you are thinking of. Philosophers would never suggest that the assumption of logical omniscience prevents one from using Bayesianism as a practical guide towards reasoning or that it’s not often a good idealization to treat degrees of belief as probabilities. However, I believe the question that this discussion is in relation to is in giving a theory that explains the fundamental nature of probability claims and here the fact that we really aren’t logically omniscient prevents us from identifying probabilities with something like rational degrees of belief (though that proposal has other problems too).
3. It’s not like philosophers haven’t put in plenty of effort looking for probability like systems that don’t presume logical omniscience. They have developed any number of them but none seem particularly useful and I’m not convinced that the paper you link about this will be much different (not that they are wrong just not that useful).
I don’t want to base my argument on that video. It’s based on the intuitions for philosophy I developed doing my BA in it at Oxford. I expect to be able to find better examples, but don’t have the energy to do that now. This should be read more as “I’m pointing at something that others who have done philosophy might also have experienced”, rather than “I’m giving a rigorous defense of the claim that even people outside philosophy might appreciate”.