And suppose that by “benevolent” we mean capable of consistently and reliably acting in the long-term best interests of humans.
...I in fact meant humans as individuals. And traits that act in the long-term best interests of individuals do in fact exert selection pressure on the genome.
But perhaps you’re suggesting that by “benevolent” I ought to have meant capable of consistently and reliably acting in the long-term best interests of humanity as a species, and not necessarily the individual?
Ah, I was thrown by the plural at the end of your definition.
But by saying humans aren’t benevolent, you mean that there are no/few humans for which it’s true that “this person consistently acts in hir own best interests?”
Yes, that’s what I mean. Actually, more broadly, I mean that there are no humans for which it’s true that they consistently act in anyone’s best interests, including themselves.
“Whereas humans aren’t benevolent, despite what would seem to be significant selection pressure for benevolence operating over the same time-period.”
Evolution doesn’t act for the good of the species, so this looks wrong.
That’s an interesting distinction. When I said:
...I in fact meant humans as individuals. And traits that act in the long-term best interests of individuals do in fact exert selection pressure on the genome.
But perhaps you’re suggesting that by “benevolent” I ought to have meant capable of consistently and reliably acting in the long-term best interests of humanity as a species, and not necessarily the individual?
Ah, I was thrown by the plural at the end of your definition.
But by saying humans aren’t benevolent, you mean that there are no/few humans for which it’s true that “this person consistently acts in hir own best interests?”
Yes, that’s what I mean. Actually, more broadly, I mean that there are no humans for which it’s true that they consistently act in anyone’s best interests, including themselves.