Option 1 is to live in a stimulated world where you have infinite utility
No. First, if you want to learn about us, you don’t get to define our utility functions. Beings with utility functions you make up are made up beings.
Second, there is a distinction that I believe EY makes which seems to me a good one, which I think you are mistaking. Utility functions may be functions on the world, not only on the state of our feelings or experience. Telling me how wonderful I will feel in a simulation does not ping my preferences over reality beyond my feelings.
This is a fundamental error Sam Harris makes, thinking we only care about conscious experience. Conscious experience may be how we experience caring, but it is not necessarily the only object of our caring.
No. First, if you want to learn about us, you don’t get to define our utility functions. Beings with utility functions you make up are made up beings.
Second, there is a distinction that I believe EY makes which seems to me a good one, which I think you are mistaking. Utility functions may be functions on the world, not only on the state of our feelings or experience. Telling me how wonderful I will feel in a simulation does not ping my preferences over reality beyond my feelings.
This is a fundamental error Sam Harris makes, thinking we only care about conscious experience. Conscious experience may be how we experience caring, but it is not necessarily the only object of our caring.