The real answer to torture vs. dust specks is to recognize that the answer to the scenario is torture, but the scenario itself has a prior probability so astronomically low that no evidence could ever convince you that you were in it, since at most k/3^^^3 people can affect the fate of 3^^^3 people at once (where k is the number of times a person’s fate is affected). However, there are higher-probability scenarios that look like torture vs. 3^^^3 dust specks, but are actually torture vs. nothing or torture vs. not-enough-specks-to-care. In philosophical problems we ignore that issue for simplicity and assume the problem statement is true with probability exactly 1, but you can’t do that in real life, and in this case intuition sides with reality.
Therefore, answer dust specks, but build theories as though the answer were torture.
The same points in Pascal’s Mugging apply. 3^^^3 has a relatively low K-complexity, which means that, if someone where to just tell you it happens, the expected number would still be astronomical.
There are higher-probability things that actually apply. They’re just more like torture vs. significantly less torture. The bias is still enough to keep the paradox strong.
The real answer to torture vs. dust specks is to recognize that the answer to the scenario is torture, but the scenario itself has a prior probability so astronomically low that no evidence could ever convince you that you were in it, since at most k/3^^^3 people can affect the fate of 3^^^3 people at once (where k is the number of times a person’s fate is affected). However, there are higher-probability scenarios that look like torture vs. 3^^^3 dust specks, but are actually torture vs. nothing or torture vs. not-enough-specks-to-care. In philosophical problems we ignore that issue for simplicity and assume the problem statement is true with probability exactly 1, but you can’t do that in real life, and in this case intuition sides with reality.
Therefore, answer dust specks, but build theories as though the answer were torture.
The same points in Pascal’s Mugging apply. 3^^^3 has a relatively low K-complexity, which means that, if someone where to just tell you it happens, the expected number would still be astronomical.
There are higher-probability things that actually apply. They’re just more like torture vs. significantly less torture. The bias is still enough to keep the paradox strong.