(Then again, it has been argued, if a Coherentist were decieved by an evil demon they could be decieved into thinking data coheres when it doesn’t. Since their belief rests upon the assumption that their beliefs cohere, should they not discard if they can’t know if it coheres or not? The seems to cohere formulation has it’s own problem)
Doesn’t Coherentism idea say that even if the knowledge is incorrect, it is still “true” for the observer because it coheres with the rest of their beliefs?
The opinion Eliezer says is essentially that yes, you can’t know anything, but at some point you have to act and acting as if you have knowledge leads to better outcomes. Yes, this ignores the problem of induction. The justification for this is that it works, and even if it can be proven, it gets results.
Also, advice for “losing:” Don’t think of it as losing. Don’t identify as a Foundationalist, identify as someone who’s trying to find the truth, and according to your beliefs in the past Foundationalism seemed like the most likely answer. Now, you have evidence that this isn’t the case, and should change beliefs accordingly.
I like your advice about losing and will take it unless I find a brilliant Foundationalist argument pretty soon. As for the rest, though, ignoring the problem of induction means conceding that all action and belief is irrational. Unless the senses and memory can be considered trustworthy (not demonstrated), it is irrational to use it as evidence for better outcomes.
By irrational, do you mean philosophically or in real life? Because someone who acted like there was no knowledge would do pretty terribly in life, and I would not call that rational.
If you mean philosophically, then yes. I’ve never heard a good answer to the problem of induction that doesn’t invoke God or isn’t circular.
Doesn’t Coherentism idea say that even if the knowledge is incorrect, it is still “true” for the observer because it coheres with the rest of their beliefs?
The opinion Eliezer says is essentially that yes, you can’t know anything, but at some point you have to act and acting as if you have knowledge leads to better outcomes. Yes, this ignores the problem of induction. The justification for this is that it works, and even if it can be proven, it gets results.
Also, advice for “losing:” Don’t think of it as losing. Don’t identify as a Foundationalist, identify as someone who’s trying to find the truth, and according to your beliefs in the past Foundationalism seemed like the most likely answer. Now, you have evidence that this isn’t the case, and should change beliefs accordingly.
I like your advice about losing and will take it unless I find a brilliant Foundationalist argument pretty soon. As for the rest, though, ignoring the problem of induction means conceding that all action and belief is irrational. Unless the senses and memory can be considered trustworthy (not demonstrated), it is irrational to use it as evidence for better outcomes.
By irrational, do you mean philosophically or in real life? Because someone who acted like there was no knowledge would do pretty terribly in life, and I would not call that rational.
If you mean philosophically, then yes. I’ve never heard a good answer to the problem of induction that doesn’t invoke God or isn’t circular.