I doubt people are actually still interesting, but just in case I’ve actually managed to solve this problem.
IF the Correspondence Theory of Truth is assumed (defining “Truth” as that which corresponds to reality) and the assumption is made that philosophy should pursue truth rather than what is pragmatically useful, then for any non-Strong Foundationalist method of determining truth the objection could be made that it could easily have no correlation with reality and there would be no way of knowing.
Probabalistic arguments fall apart because they would require accepting axioms of probability that cannot themselves be demonstrated. Although they could be made definitions, that does not demonstrate any usefulness in dealing with reality.
I doubt people are actually still interesting, but just in case I’ve actually managed to solve this problem.
IF the Correspondence Theory of Truth is assumed (defining “Truth” as that which corresponds to reality) and the assumption is made that philosophy should pursue truth rather than what is pragmatically useful, then for any non-Strong Foundationalist method of determining truth the objection could be made that it could easily have no correlation with reality and there would be no way of knowing.
Probabalistic arguments fall apart because they would require accepting axioms of probability that cannot themselves be demonstrated. Although they could be made definitions, that does not demonstrate any usefulness in dealing with reality.