1: The Foundationalists have claimed probability is off the metaphorical table- the concept of probability rests either on subjective feeling (irrational) or on empirical evidence(circular, as our belief in empirical evidence rests on the assumption it is probable). They had problems with self-evident, but I created a new definition as “Must be true in any possible universe” (although I’m not sure of the truth of his conclusion, the way EliIizer describes a non-reductionist universe basically claims for reductionism this sort of self-evidency).
2: Doesn’t solve the problem I have with it.
3: Of the statement “A trout is a type of fish”, the simplification “This statement is true in English” is good enough to describe reality. The invariantist, and likely the contextualist, would claim that universally, across languages, humans have a concept of “knows”, however they describe it, which fits their philosophy.
1: The Foundationalists have claimed probability is off the metaphorical table- the concept of probability rests either on subjective feeling (irrational) or on empirical evidence(circular, as our belief in empirical evidence rests on the assumption it is probable). They had problems with self-evident, but I created a new definition as “Must be true in any possible universe” (although I’m not sure of the truth of his conclusion, the way EliIizer describes a non-reductionist universe basically claims for reductionism this sort of self-evidency).
2: Doesn’t solve the problem I have with it.
3: Of the statement “A trout is a type of fish”, the simplification “This statement is true in English” is good enough to describe reality. The invariantist, and likely the contextualist, would claim that universally, across languages, humans have a concept of “knows”, however they describe it, which fits their philosophy.