A few terminological headaches in this post. Sorry for the negative tone.
There is talk of a “fixed but unknown probability,” which should always set alarm bells ringing.
More generally, I propose that whenever one assigns a probability to some parameter, that parameter is guaranteed not to be a probability.
I am also disturbed by the mention of Knightian uncertainty, descried as “uncertainty that can’t be usefully modeled in terms of probability.” Now there’s a charitable interpretation of that phrase, and I can see that there may be a psychologically relevant subset of probabilities that vaguely fits this description, but if the phrase “can’t be modeled” is to be taken literally, then I’m left wondering if the author has paid enough attention to the mind projection fallacy, or the difference between probability and frequency.
A few terminological headaches in this post. Sorry for the negative tone.
There is talk of a “fixed but unknown probability,” which should always set alarm bells ringing.
More generally, I propose that whenever one assigns a probability to some parameter, that parameter is guaranteed not to be a probability.
I am also disturbed by the mention of Knightian uncertainty, descried as “uncertainty that can’t be usefully modeled in terms of probability.” Now there’s a charitable interpretation of that phrase, and I can see that there may be a psychologically relevant subset of probabilities that vaguely fits this description, but if the phrase “can’t be modeled” is to be taken literally, then I’m left wondering if the author has paid enough attention to the mind projection fallacy, or the difference between probability and frequency.