the volition of rational beings is more important than their physical well-being
Just to be clear… you are not saying only that for all rational beings H, H’s volition is more important than H’s physical well-being. You are also saying that for any rational beings H1 and H2, H1′s volition is more important than H2′s physical well-being (and vice-versa).
Yes?
(Not planning to argue the point, just want to make sure I’ve understood you.)
With certain necessary limitations on the valid domain of volition (as otherwise volition becomes contradictory), yes. (Negative rights as a concept encapsulate these limitations pretty well for purposes of political discussion, although I’m not sure of their value in a broader philosophical sense; I consider legality a subdomain of morality, which is to say, law should be moral, but morality shouldn’t necessarily be law. Negative rights address only the legal considerations of the domain of volition.)
Just to be clear… you are not saying only that for all rational beings H, H’s volition is more important than H’s physical well-being.
You are also saying that for any rational beings H1 and H2, H1′s volition is more important than H2′s physical well-being (and vice-versa).
Yes?
(Not planning to argue the point, just want to make sure I’ve understood you.)
With certain necessary limitations on the valid domain of volition (as otherwise volition becomes contradictory), yes. (Negative rights as a concept encapsulate these limitations pretty well for purposes of political discussion, although I’m not sure of their value in a broader philosophical sense; I consider legality a subdomain of morality, which is to say, law should be moral, but morality shouldn’t necessarily be law. Negative rights address only the legal considerations of the domain of volition.)