“What do I, on reflection, think it would be best to do right now?”
“What do I, on reflection, think it would be best to do right now *if I tried to suppress my natural tendencies to be more concerned for myself than others, more concerned for those close to me than those further away, etc.?”
If you define “X thinks s/he should do Y” in terms of X’s answer to question 1 (or some slight variant worded to ensure that it always matches what X is actually doing) then, indeed, no one ever does anything they think they “shouldn’t”. But I see no reason at all to think that this sense of “should” has anything much to do with what’s usually called ethics, or indeed with anything else of much interest to anyone other than maybe X’s psychiatrist. Our actions are driven not only by our stable long-term values but also by any number of temporary whims, some of them frankly crazy.
If you define “X thinks s/he should do Y” in terms of X’s answer to question 2 or 3, then you can make a case that “should” is now something to do with ethics (especially for question 3, but maybe also for question 2) -- but now it’s not at all true that a person’s actions always match what they “think they should do”. I frequently do things that, on the whole, I think I shouldn’t do. Often while actually thinking, in so many words, “I really shouldn’t be doing this.”
And all this is true whether X is thinking about what-it-would-be-best-to-do explicitly in terms of “best in such-and-such a system of values”, or taking “best” as having an “absolute” meaning somehow.
I am not defining “X thinks they should do Y” in terms of 1, but in terms of 2. People can certainly feel inclined to do things they shouldn’t do. But if you force them into a reflective mode and they still act as they did before, it tells you about what they really believe. If it’s a failure of self-control due to habits/forgetfulness, that I can understand. But in the case of reluctant meat-eaters, it seems to be something more than that—they claim to not want to eat meat, but if you don’t want to eat meat, it’s easy not to—just don’t buy it and then you won’t have any meat to eat. Sometimes people buy things they wouldn’t reflectively want, but that’s when they’re buying something they’d view as harmful to the self (or just suboptimal), and not in the general category of “evil”. No one can simultaneously reflectively think “I shouldn’t do this (because it’s evil)” and “I should do this (evil) thing”. The only possibility is that for reluctant meat-eaters, meat is an impulse buy, but that seems unlikely.
I frequently do things that, on the whole, I think I shouldn’t do. Often while actually thinking, in so many words, “I really shouldn’t be doing this.”
I suspect you’re using two different meanings of “should” here.
But if you force them into a reflective mode [...]
OK, so either now you’re making a weaker claim than the one you started out with (“I don’t believe that it’s possible to believe that you’re doing something unethical while you’re doing it”) or I misunderstood what you meant before. Because people frequently aren’t in “a reflective mode”. (And I don’t think believing something’s unethical requires being in a reflective mode.)
But you still haven’t moved far enough for me to agree (not that there’s any particular reason you should care about that). I think I have frequently had the experience of reflecting that I really don’t want to be doing X, while doing X. It’s not that I’m not in reflective mode, it’s that the bit of me that’s in reflective mode doesn’t have overall control.
This is all a separate matter, by the way, from the question of how to use terms like “should”, “ethical”, etc., in the face of the fact that we (almost) all care much more about ourselves than about distant others, and that many of us hold that in some sense we shouldn’t. I appreciate that you wish to use those terms to refer to a person’s “overall” values as (maybe inexactly) shown by their actions, rather than to their theoretical beliefs about what morally perfect agents would do. I’m not sure I agree, but that isn’t what I’m disagreeing with here.
I suspect you’re using two different meanings of “should” here.
What meanings, and where do you think I’m using each?
I suspect our inferential distance may be too high for agreement at this time. But, to clarify on one point
What meanings, and where do you think I’m using each?
You said “I frequently do things that, on the whole, I think I shouldn’t do. Often while actually thinking, in so many words, ‘I really shouldn’t be doing this.‘”. This is a plausible rephrasing of “I frequently do things that I generally disapprove of and perhaps would prefer if people in general wouldn’t do them, also I may sometimes feel guilty about doing things I disapprove of, especially if they’re generally socially disapproved of in my culture, subculture, or social group. When I do these things, I think the words ‘I shouldn’t do this’, by which I don’t literally mean that I shouldn’t do this, but that doing this is ‘boo!’/‘ugh’/low-status/seems to conflict with things I approve of/would not happen in a world I’d prefer to live in.”
I suspect our inferential distance may be too high for agreement at this time.
Oh. Would you care to say more?
(meanings of “should”)
So, your proposed expansion of my second “should”: (1) on what grounds do you think it likely that I mean that, and (2) is it actually different from your proposed expansion of the first? (“Seems to conflict with things I approve of” and “would not happen in a world I’d prefer to live in” are not far from “things that I generally disapprove of” and “perhaps would prefer if people in general wouldn’t do them”, respectively.)
It seems a little curious to me that your proposed expansion of my second “should” offers, in fact, not one possible meaning but five (though I’m not sure there’s a very clear distinction between “boo!” and “ugh” here). It seems to me that this weakens your point—as if you’re sure I must mean something other than what I say, but you have no real idea what.
In fact, despite your dismissive references to social status in what you say, I can’t help suspecting that you’re trying to pull a sort of status move here: when blacktrance says “should” s/he really means “should”, but when gjm says “should” he means “hooray!” or “high-status” or something—anything! -- with a little touch of intellectual dishonesty about it.
Well, you might be right. But let’s see some evidence, if so.
This wouldn’t be the first time I’ve run into inferential distances when discussing ethics on LW, and I suspect it to be the case here, perhaps in part due to differences in terminology, in part due to unstated background assumptions.
on what grounds do you think it likely that I mean that
I don’t know if you in particular mean that, but it’s a common usage I’ve noticed among people who do things that they say they shouldn’t do.
I think I rambled a little too much in my expansion, so to compress it into something more compact: “I occasionally do things I and/or people whose opinions I care about label as ‘morally bad’, and when I do these things, I think the words ‘I shouldn’t do this’. In part I’ve internalized that doing this thing is ‘bad’, but I don’t actually think it’s bad, and I still choose to do it.” To further clarify, when people say “I shouldn’t do X”, they mean that it feels like an external imposition for them, and if they could do what they wanted, they’d cast it aside and do X, and only the desire to be moral (perhaps motivated by guilt, shame, or adherence to social norms) is keeping them from doing it. There is another sense of “I shouldn’t do X”, as in “I shouldn’t put my hand on a hot stove”—there’s no external imposition there, motivation is entirely internal. Both meanings of “should” are common, and perhaps I am wrong to say that only the second, internal meaning of “should” is valid.
If one thinks that one externally-shouldn’t eat meat, they may still eat meat because they don’t think they internally-shouldn’t eat meat. I forgot (due to inferential differences) that belief that morality is external is common (a belief I do not share), and in that case it’s certainly possible to believe you’re acting unethically and still consistently want to eat meat.
Here are a few related but different questions.
“What do I feel most inclined to do right now?”
“What do I, on reflection, think it would be best to do right now?”
“What do I, on reflection, think it would be best to do right now *if I tried to suppress my natural tendencies to be more concerned for myself than others, more concerned for those close to me than those further away, etc.?”
If you define “X thinks s/he should do Y” in terms of X’s answer to question 1 (or some slight variant worded to ensure that it always matches what X is actually doing) then, indeed, no one ever does anything they think they “shouldn’t”. But I see no reason at all to think that this sense of “should” has anything much to do with what’s usually called ethics, or indeed with anything else of much interest to anyone other than maybe X’s psychiatrist. Our actions are driven not only by our stable long-term values but also by any number of temporary whims, some of them frankly crazy.
If you define “X thinks s/he should do Y” in terms of X’s answer to question 2 or 3, then you can make a case that “should” is now something to do with ethics (especially for question 3, but maybe also for question 2) -- but now it’s not at all true that a person’s actions always match what they “think they should do”. I frequently do things that, on the whole, I think I shouldn’t do. Often while actually thinking, in so many words, “I really shouldn’t be doing this.”
And all this is true whether X is thinking about what-it-would-be-best-to-do explicitly in terms of “best in such-and-such a system of values”, or taking “best” as having an “absolute” meaning somehow.
I am not defining “X thinks they should do Y” in terms of 1, but in terms of 2. People can certainly feel inclined to do things they shouldn’t do. But if you force them into a reflective mode and they still act as they did before, it tells you about what they really believe. If it’s a failure of self-control due to habits/forgetfulness, that I can understand. But in the case of reluctant meat-eaters, it seems to be something more than that—they claim to not want to eat meat, but if you don’t want to eat meat, it’s easy not to—just don’t buy it and then you won’t have any meat to eat. Sometimes people buy things they wouldn’t reflectively want, but that’s when they’re buying something they’d view as harmful to the self (or just suboptimal), and not in the general category of “evil”. No one can simultaneously reflectively think “I shouldn’t do this (because it’s evil)” and “I should do this (evil) thing”. The only possibility is that for reluctant meat-eaters, meat is an impulse buy, but that seems unlikely.
I suspect you’re using two different meanings of “should” here.
OK, so either now you’re making a weaker claim than the one you started out with (“I don’t believe that it’s possible to believe that you’re doing something unethical while you’re doing it”) or I misunderstood what you meant before. Because people frequently aren’t in “a reflective mode”. (And I don’t think believing something’s unethical requires being in a reflective mode.)
But you still haven’t moved far enough for me to agree (not that there’s any particular reason you should care about that). I think I have frequently had the experience of reflecting that I really don’t want to be doing X, while doing X. It’s not that I’m not in reflective mode, it’s that the bit of me that’s in reflective mode doesn’t have overall control.
This is all a separate matter, by the way, from the question of how to use terms like “should”, “ethical”, etc., in the face of the fact that we (almost) all care much more about ourselves than about distant others, and that many of us hold that in some sense we shouldn’t. I appreciate that you wish to use those terms to refer to a person’s “overall” values as (maybe inexactly) shown by their actions, rather than to their theoretical beliefs about what morally perfect agents would do. I’m not sure I agree, but that isn’t what I’m disagreeing with here.
What meanings, and where do you think I’m using each?
I suspect our inferential distance may be too high for agreement at this time. But, to clarify on one point
You said “I frequently do things that, on the whole, I think I shouldn’t do. Often while actually thinking, in so many words, ‘I really shouldn’t be doing this.‘”. This is a plausible rephrasing of “I frequently do things that I generally disapprove of and perhaps would prefer if people in general wouldn’t do them, also I may sometimes feel guilty about doing things I disapprove of, especially if they’re generally socially disapproved of in my culture, subculture, or social group. When I do these things, I think the words ‘I shouldn’t do this’, by which I don’t literally mean that I shouldn’t do this, but that doing this is ‘boo!’/‘ugh’/low-status/seems to conflict with things I approve of/would not happen in a world I’d prefer to live in.”
Oh. Would you care to say more?
So, your proposed expansion of my second “should”: (1) on what grounds do you think it likely that I mean that, and (2) is it actually different from your proposed expansion of the first? (“Seems to conflict with things I approve of” and “would not happen in a world I’d prefer to live in” are not far from “things that I generally disapprove of” and “perhaps would prefer if people in general wouldn’t do them”, respectively.)
It seems a little curious to me that your proposed expansion of my second “should” offers, in fact, not one possible meaning but five (though I’m not sure there’s a very clear distinction between “boo!” and “ugh” here). It seems to me that this weakens your point—as if you’re sure I must mean something other than what I say, but you have no real idea what.
In fact, despite your dismissive references to social status in what you say, I can’t help suspecting that you’re trying to pull a sort of status move here: when blacktrance says “should” s/he really means “should”, but when gjm says “should” he means “hooray!” or “high-status” or something—anything! -- with a little touch of intellectual dishonesty about it.
Well, you might be right. But let’s see some evidence, if so.
This wouldn’t be the first time I’ve run into inferential distances when discussing ethics on LW, and I suspect it to be the case here, perhaps in part due to differences in terminology, in part due to unstated background assumptions.
I don’t know if you in particular mean that, but it’s a common usage I’ve noticed among people who do things that they say they shouldn’t do.
I think I rambled a little too much in my expansion, so to compress it into something more compact: “I occasionally do things I and/or people whose opinions I care about label as ‘morally bad’, and when I do these things, I think the words ‘I shouldn’t do this’. In part I’ve internalized that doing this thing is ‘bad’, but I don’t actually think it’s bad, and I still choose to do it.” To further clarify, when people say “I shouldn’t do X”, they mean that it feels like an external imposition for them, and if they could do what they wanted, they’d cast it aside and do X, and only the desire to be moral (perhaps motivated by guilt, shame, or adherence to social norms) is keeping them from doing it. There is another sense of “I shouldn’t do X”, as in “I shouldn’t put my hand on a hot stove”—there’s no external imposition there, motivation is entirely internal. Both meanings of “should” are common, and perhaps I am wrong to say that only the second, internal meaning of “should” is valid.
If one thinks that one externally-shouldn’t eat meat, they may still eat meat because they don’t think they internally-shouldn’t eat meat. I forgot (due to inferential differences) that belief that morality is external is common (a belief I do not share), and in that case it’s certainly possible to believe you’re acting unethically and still consistently want to eat meat.