right but I think that the question is more about what exactly is this property of ‘having experiences’, or what follows from it, that seperates illusionists from a more sort of ‘hard problem’ approach to conciousness (where the existence of such experiences is a sort of extra data that has to be explained)
I have a similar view as @Charbel-Raphaël that the ‘hard problem’ can be dissolved rather than solved. In that sense again I am an illusionist. It’s not easy to dissolve right now, because of how little we understand consciousness, but I believe that solving the mapping problem precisely will give us enough conceptual leverage to understand why the hard problem is nonsensical.
right but I think that the question is more about what exactly is this property of ‘having experiences’, or what follows from it, that seperates illusionists from a more sort of ‘hard problem’ approach to conciousness (where the existence of such experiences is a sort of extra data that has to be explained)
I have a similar view as @Charbel-Raphaël that the ‘hard problem’ can be dissolved rather than solved. In that sense again I am an illusionist. It’s not easy to dissolve right now, because of how little we understand consciousness, but I believe that solving the mapping problem precisely will give us enough conceptual leverage to understand why the hard problem is nonsensical.