ShardPhoenix: Yes. This is the same principle that says that credible confidentiality within a group can sometimes improve aggregate information flow and collective epistemology.
Tim Tyler: Human goals. I definitely do NOT want alien rationalists to be able to lie, but I doubt I have much choice regarding that. Also not transhuman children. There I might have some limited choice.
Eliezer: I certainly think that rationalists should practice telling truth more effectively as well as lie, and you admit that not lying enough makes people gullible, so it’s mostly a matter of estimates of the magnitude of the relevant trade-offs here.
I think that our disagreements are based on radically different models of social psychology. We disagree a great deal about the degree to which being known to sometimes lie reduces future credibility in the eyes of actual existent humans relative to being known to sometimes mislead without lying. I believe that being known to lie increases credibility somewhat relative to “wizards oath”, while you think it greatly decreases it. I think that I know your reasons for your belief and that you don’t know mine. I’m not sure whether you think that I know your reasons, and I’m not sure whether this difference in social psychological theory is the specific belief we disagree about. I’d like confirmation on whether you agree that this is our main point of disagreement. Also possibly a poll of the audience on the social psychology fact.
ShardPhoenix: Yes. This is the same principle that says that credible confidentiality within a group can sometimes improve aggregate information flow and collective epistemology.
Tim Tyler: Human goals. I definitely do NOT want alien rationalists to be able to lie, but I doubt I have much choice regarding that. Also not transhuman children. There I might have some limited choice.
Eliezer: I certainly think that rationalists should practice telling truth more effectively as well as lie, and you admit that not lying enough makes people gullible, so it’s mostly a matter of estimates of the magnitude of the relevant trade-offs here. I think that our disagreements are based on radically different models of social psychology. We disagree a great deal about the degree to which being known to sometimes lie reduces future credibility in the eyes of actual existent humans relative to being known to sometimes mislead without lying. I believe that being known to lie increases credibility somewhat relative to “wizards oath”, while you think it greatly decreases it. I think that I know your reasons for your belief and that you don’t know mine. I’m not sure whether you think that I know your reasons, and I’m not sure whether this difference in social psychological theory is the specific belief we disagree about. I’d like confirmation on whether you agree that this is our main point of disagreement. Also possibly a poll of the audience on the social psychology fact.