I think this is not true, insofar as philosophy is done with words, and so can’t excise itself from the world of conceptualization and still be philosophy. This doesn’t mean philosophy must only or always be about words and concepts, but that philosophy can never ignore that it’s attempting to understand the world through words and concepts, and as such that understanding may the tainted by those words.
The other sciences are also done with words though? Other sciences are also understanding the world through words/concepts, and so their understanding can be tainted by those. I’m open to there being a quantitative difference between sciences and philosophy here, but I’m not seeing a qualitative difference.
The difference is that, when we do, say, physics or mathematics, we take for granted the relationship between symbols and their referents and assume that relationship to be sound. This leaves only the question of how to define basic terms, but once those terms are defined, the rest can proceed via formalism and application of formalism to observations.
I want to be clear that I think this is an extremely reasonable thing to do! It would be very hard to do, say, geometry, if we were constantly debating what points and lines are. Instead, we create formal definitions, assume them to be true, and move forward. Similarly, in physics, though the process is a bit more complex, we infer theories from observations, those theories posit the world to be categorized in some way, and then proceed to draw further conclusions on the assumption a theory holds insofar as it provides a meaningly useful ontology to make sense of observations.
Philosophy has a different challenge, in that it includes within it to scope of study the action of creating categories. That is, it must use categories to make sense of categories, not in the way we do in math, but in the messy way that minds actually categorize the world. This sets it apart from sciences in that it must tackle the question of how we use concepts at all, and it must do so all while reasoning with concepts, which leads to a number of weird problems that break formalisms.
The other sciences are also done with words though? Other sciences are also understanding the world through words/concepts, and so their understanding can be tainted by those. I’m open to there being a quantitative difference between sciences and philosophy here, but I’m not seeing a qualitative difference.
The difference is that, when we do, say, physics or mathematics, we take for granted the relationship between symbols and their referents and assume that relationship to be sound. This leaves only the question of how to define basic terms, but once those terms are defined, the rest can proceed via formalism and application of formalism to observations.
I want to be clear that I think this is an extremely reasonable thing to do! It would be very hard to do, say, geometry, if we were constantly debating what points and lines are. Instead, we create formal definitions, assume them to be true, and move forward. Similarly, in physics, though the process is a bit more complex, we infer theories from observations, those theories posit the world to be categorized in some way, and then proceed to draw further conclusions on the assumption a theory holds insofar as it provides a meaningly useful ontology to make sense of observations.
Philosophy has a different challenge, in that it includes within it to scope of study the action of creating categories. That is, it must use categories to make sense of categories, not in the way we do in math, but in the messy way that minds actually categorize the world. This sets it apart from sciences in that it must tackle the question of how we use concepts at all, and it must do so all while reasoning with concepts, which leads to a number of weird problems that break formalisms.