You are correct in that there is quite a lot of contention when it comes to the current structure of the international system. While the PRC undoubtedly has a lot of economic heft, the degree to which this actually impacts the “polarity” of the system is unclear. The USSR was not a great power merely because it had a lot of tanks; it was at least seen as a political hegemon that controlled critical territory that allowed it potential world domination. It also had a a foreign policy objective diametrically opposed to the US—leading non-US aligned states to side with it—and parity with the US in the nuclear realm.
The degree to which these are empirically true is itself unclear, but less so that they were norms in the international community (or at least that is what a constructivist scholar would claim). China however does not posses any of these qualities. It does not control critical territory that would expand its influence further (While the south China sea is a vital corridor for world trade, it is not as useful as Eastern Europe for world conquest). China far lags behind the US in nuclear capability, with the US not just a power of ten ahead, but possesing far more advanced delivery systems and a more reliable sea-based force. Most critically it does not have global influence and alliances in the way the US does; this is what I think really differentiates the system from having merely two strong actors and having one dominant superpower. American power comes not from mere GDP or military power, but in the way it has used these capabilities through NATO and foreign investment/trade to project power.
This is not to say that the PRC is not a significant adversary to the US, but I am not convinced that after mentioning that “[t]he historical data show that wide gaps in capabilities, and the possession of very different kinds of power, are common among great powers” one can not declare that “The world is bipolar” from the broad metrics of GDP and military expediture.
If you want to read a different perspective from a realist (although a neoclassical realist instead of what I assume to be Lind’s neorealist) I recommend The Myth of Multipolarity.
On the other hand, China is definitely trying to build those alliances and the global influence that you speak of. One example would be the belt and road initiative, by which China is pouring money into low-income countries in Asia and Africa. Also, China not having a nuclear arsenal as big or as advanced delivery systems for warheads is somewhat irrelevant, since it still has an arsenal that could destroy all of the major American population centers more than twice over.
That is absolutely true, but it remains to be seen if those attempts will hold up in the long run. There is a big difference between American power being in decline (but still dominant) and the world being multipolar. I would say that currently the derivative is <0 but American power is still vastly greater than any other country.
Of course the Chinese nuclear arsenal is enough in absolute terms to destroy a large segment of the US population (and an even greater share of GDP) but I would not say the same in practice. Contrary to the US and Russia, China has a “no first use” nuclear weapons doctrine. This piece of policy does have material consequences, meaning that the PRC’s nuclear arsenal is really just a large stockpile of weapons, not a 24/7/365 array of ICBM bunkers. There is no such thing as a Chinese “red button”, but there is an American one. The PRC also possesses no significant SLBM potential, meaning that the US could probably wipe out much of the Chinese land based capability and population centers with minimal losses in return.
I guess my point is that there are diminishing diplomatic/power rewards from increasing the number of nuclear weapons in your stockpile. While having nuclear capability is certainly important to be considered a superpower, the advantage the US gains over China by having a nuclear arsenal way bigger than the the Chinese one is, in my view, relatively small. China still has enough nuclear weapons to make launching missiles at it a really bad idea for a president of the US who wants to keep his job/his party’s political power/his citizens safe (even including the possible incompetency of China’s nuclear force—see this report). Also, having a no first use policy would matter more if China’s leader was bound by his countries laws, which he is unfortunately not.
You are correct in that there is quite a lot of contention when it comes to the current structure of the international system. While the PRC undoubtedly has a lot of economic heft, the degree to which this actually impacts the “polarity” of the system is unclear. The USSR was not a great power merely because it had a lot of tanks; it was at least seen as a political hegemon that controlled critical territory that allowed it potential world domination. It also had a a foreign policy objective diametrically opposed to the US—leading non-US aligned states to side with it—and parity with the US in the nuclear realm.
The degree to which these are empirically true is itself unclear, but less so that they were norms in the international community (or at least that is what a constructivist scholar would claim). China however does not posses any of these qualities. It does not control critical territory that would expand its influence further (While the south China sea is a vital corridor for world trade, it is not as useful as Eastern Europe for world conquest). China far lags behind the US in nuclear capability, with the US not just a power of ten ahead, but possesing far more advanced delivery systems and a more reliable sea-based force. Most critically it does not have global influence and alliances in the way the US does; this is what I think really differentiates the system from having merely two strong actors and having one dominant superpower. American power comes not from mere GDP or military power, but in the way it has used these capabilities through NATO and foreign investment/trade to project power.
This is not to say that the PRC is not a significant adversary to the US, but I am not convinced that after mentioning that “[t]he historical data show that wide gaps in capabilities, and the possession of very different kinds of power, are common among great powers” one can not declare that “The world is bipolar” from the broad metrics of GDP and military expediture.
If you want to read a different perspective from a realist (although a neoclassical realist instead of what I assume to be Lind’s neorealist) I recommend The Myth of Multipolarity.
On the other hand, China is definitely trying to build those alliances and the global influence that you speak of. One example would be the belt and road initiative, by which China is pouring money into low-income countries in Asia and Africa. Also, China not having a nuclear arsenal as big or as advanced delivery systems for warheads is somewhat irrelevant, since it still has an arsenal that could destroy all of the major American population centers more than twice over.
That is absolutely true, but it remains to be seen if those attempts will hold up in the long run. There is a big difference between American power being in decline (but still dominant) and the world being multipolar. I would say that currently the derivative is <0 but American power is still vastly greater than any other country.
Of course the Chinese nuclear arsenal is enough in absolute terms to destroy a large segment of the US population (and an even greater share of GDP) but I would not say the same in practice. Contrary to the US and Russia, China has a “no first use” nuclear weapons doctrine. This piece of policy does have material consequences, meaning that the PRC’s nuclear arsenal is really just a large stockpile of weapons, not a 24/7/365 array of ICBM bunkers. There is no such thing as a Chinese “red button”, but there is an American one. The PRC also possesses no significant SLBM potential, meaning that the US could probably wipe out much of the Chinese land based capability and population centers with minimal losses in return.
I guess my point is that there are diminishing diplomatic/power rewards from increasing the number of nuclear weapons in your stockpile. While having nuclear capability is certainly important to be considered a superpower, the advantage the US gains over China by having a nuclear arsenal way bigger than the the Chinese one is, in my view, relatively small. China still has enough nuclear weapons to make launching missiles at it a really bad idea for a president of the US who wants to keep his job/his party’s political power/his citizens safe (even including the possible incompetency of China’s nuclear force—see this report). Also, having a no first use policy would matter more if China’s leader was bound by his countries laws, which he is unfortunately not.