This, and several of the passages in your original post such as, “I agree such a definition of moral value would be hard to justify,” seem to imply some assumption of moral realism that I sometimes encounter as well, but have never really found convincing arguments for. I would say that the successionists you’re talking to are making a category error, and I would not much trust their understanding of ‘should’-ness outside normal day-to-day contexts.
I broadly agree.
I am indeed being a bit sloppy with the moral language in my post. What I mean to say is something like “insofar as you’re trying to describe a moral realist position with a utility function to be optimized for, it’d be hard to justify valuing your specific likeness”.
In a similar fashion, I prefer and value my family more than your family but it’d be weird for me to say that you also should prefer my family to your own family.
However, I expect our interests and preferences to align when it comes to preferring that we have the right to prefer our own families, or preferring that our species exists.
(Meta: I am extremely far from an expert on moral philosophy or philosophy in general, I do aspire to improve how rigorously I am able to articulate my positions.)
I broadly agree.
I am indeed being a bit sloppy with the moral language in my post. What I mean to say is something like “insofar as you’re trying to describe a moral realist position with a utility function to be optimized for, it’d be hard to justify valuing your specific likeness”.
In a similar fashion, I prefer and value my family more than your family but it’d be weird for me to say that you also should prefer my family to your own family.
However, I expect our interests and preferences to align when it comes to preferring that we have the right to prefer our own families, or preferring that our species exists.
(Meta: I am extremely far from an expert on moral philosophy or philosophy in general, I do aspire to improve how rigorously I am able to articulate my positions.)