You objection to the universal prior is: “what if Occam’s razor breaks”?!?
Engineers would not normally be concerned with such things. Occam’s razor has been fine for hundreds of years. If it ever breaks, we will update our probability expectations with whatever the new distribution is. Surely that is no big deal.
Original priors are not too important, anway. As soon as an agent is born, it is flooded with information from the world about the actual frequencies of things—and its original priors are quickly washed away and replaced with experience. If their experiences involve encounting the uncomputable, agents will simply update accordingly.
So: this topic seems like angels and pinheads—at least to me.
You objection to the universal prior is: “what if Occam’s razor breaks”?!?
Engineers would not normally be concerned with such things. Occam’s razor has been fine for hundreds of years. If it ever breaks, we will update our probability expectations with whatever the new distribution is. Surely that is no big deal.
Original priors are not too important, anway. As soon as an agent is born, it is flooded with information from the world about the actual frequencies of things—and its original priors are quickly washed away and replaced with experience. If their experiences involve encounting the uncomputable, agents will simply update accordingly.
So: this topic seems like angels and pinheads—at least to me.