A major part of “responsibility” is knowing whether an action is wrong or not, and choosing an action that they knew to be wrong. This does not depends upon free will of any kind. If a person is not capable of knowing whether an action is wrong or not then they have diminished responsibility. Note that in such cases the person often still faces legal and societal consequences.
Furthermore, we usually only hold actions to be “wrong” where we (as a society) believe that almost everyone in the corresponding situation would be capable of doing the right thing. This too does not require free will to exist: it is a hypothetical and therefore in the map, not the territory.
These principles can be based in consequentialist models that hold just as well in completely deterministic universes as free-willed ones: agents complex enough to have moral models of behaviour at all, and capable of updating those models, can be trained to not do things harmful to society.
With the example of a chess computer losing a game that you wanted it to win, is it plausible that the computer knew that losing was wrong? Maybe in the case of a very advanced computer that has such things as part of its model, but almost certainly not in general. Did it choose to lose, knowing that it was wrong to do so? Again, almost certainly not. Even in hypothetical cases where it knew that losing was wrong, it likely operated according to a model in which it believed that the moves it made gave it an increased chance of winning over moves it did not. Would almost everyone in a comparable situation have been capable of taking the right action (in the scenario presented, winning)? Almost certainly not. So all three criteria here fail, and by the failure of the third mere loss of a chess game is not even a morally culpable action.
Is it likely that a dog peeing on the carpet knows that it is wrong? An adult, house-trained dog probably does, while a puppy almost certainly does not. Most of the other answers are likewise situation-dependent. An adult, house-trained dog with no reasonable excuse (such as being prevented from accessing the “proper” place to urinate or suffering from medical incontinence) probably could be held morally responsible. A puppy peeing on the carpet, or a bear eating a hiker, almost certainly could not.
I’m not sure where the problem with regret’s “irrationality” lies. It’s an emotion, not a decision or belief, and rationality does not apply. It may help you update in the right direction though, and communicate that update to others.
A major part of “responsibility” is knowing whether an action is wrong or not, and choosing an action that they knew to be wrong. This does not depends upon free will of any kind. If a person is not capable of knowing whether an action is wrong or not then they have diminished responsibility. Note that in such cases the person often still faces legal and societal consequences.
Furthermore, we usually only hold actions to be “wrong” where we (as a society) believe that almost everyone in the corresponding situation would be capable of doing the right thing. This too does not require free will to exist: it is a hypothetical and therefore in the map, not the territory.
These principles can be based in consequentialist models that hold just as well in completely deterministic universes as free-willed ones: agents complex enough to have moral models of behaviour at all, and capable of updating those models, can be trained to not do things harmful to society.
With the example of a chess computer losing a game that you wanted it to win, is it plausible that the computer knew that losing was wrong? Maybe in the case of a very advanced computer that has such things as part of its model, but almost certainly not in general. Did it choose to lose, knowing that it was wrong to do so? Again, almost certainly not. Even in hypothetical cases where it knew that losing was wrong, it likely operated according to a model in which it believed that the moves it made gave it an increased chance of winning over moves it did not. Would almost everyone in a comparable situation have been capable of taking the right action (in the scenario presented, winning)? Almost certainly not. So all three criteria here fail, and by the failure of the third mere loss of a chess game is not even a morally culpable action.
Is it likely that a dog peeing on the carpet knows that it is wrong? An adult, house-trained dog probably does, while a puppy almost certainly does not. Most of the other answers are likewise situation-dependent. An adult, house-trained dog with no reasonable excuse (such as being prevented from accessing the “proper” place to urinate or suffering from medical incontinence) probably could be held morally responsible. A puppy peeing on the carpet, or a bear eating a hiker, almost certainly could not.
I’m not sure where the problem with regret’s “irrationality” lies. It’s an emotion, not a decision or belief, and rationality does not apply. It may help you update in the right direction though, and communicate that update to others.